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PREFACE
The purpose of this study of 'Monarchical Tendencies
in the United States" is not iconoclastic. It is, rather, construc-
tive, since it is an attempt to follow up certain brief assertions
of standard historians in a manner to give a more complete picture
of the political situation in the period treated.
Some writers have characterized as absurd the assertions
that there were monarchical tendencies in the United States in the
1
first few decades after the Revolution. On the other hand, so
eminent an authority as Professor Farrand 'Venders if there were
2
not some thoughts of monarchy." The present work is not offered
as an exhaustive treatment, but with the hope that it may serve
as a nucleus for further investigation.
The topic was discussed in several sessions of the
American History Seminar this year, and the writer is indebted to
members of the Seminar, and most especially to Professor Greene,
for valuable suggestions.
1
For example, see Charles J. Stille's "Life and
Writings of John Dickinson," Vol. !• p. 234.
2
Parrand, "The Framing of the Constitution," p. 174.
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CELtPTEH I
Introduction.
A letter which Washington wrote to John Jaj in the
summer of 1786 contains a passage which furnishes several points
of departure for the present investigation. Had he expended the
ideas expressed therein, the problem of the nature and extent of
monarchical tendencies on the eve of the Convention would be de-
void of many of the difficulties that now confront us. I refer to
the following paragraph:
''Vlfhat astonishing changes a few years are capable of
producing. I am told that even respectable characters speak of a
monarchical form of government without horror. From thinking
proceeds speaking; thence to acting is often but a single step.
But how irrevocable and tremendous! ?/hat a triumph for our enemies
to verify their predictions! What a triumph for the advocates of
despotism to find, that we are incapable of governing ourselves,
and that systems founded on the basis of equal liberty are merely
ideal and fallacious! Would to God, that wise measures may be
taken in time to evert the consequences we have but too much
1
reason to apprehend,"
There is sufficient evidence of Washington's general
sincerity and truthfulness to eliminate any question as to falsifi-
cation in this letter. The problem of its critical evaluation
as source material is whether or not there is reason to believe
"^Mount Yernon, August 1, 1786, Washington's '•Writings,"
XI, p. 55,
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that its writer was sufficiently aoquainted with the situation
to make advisedly suoh statements as those quoted. As is well
knovm, Washington had retired to private life at the close of
the Revolutionary War, and at the time he wrote this letter was
living quietly at Mount Vernon, busy with his own private affairs.
He was not, therefore, in close personal touch with governmental
bodies, nor, since he did not travel, did he have a stock of per-
sonal observations on parts of the country beyond his own neigh-
borhood.
On the other hand, a survey of V/ashington's correspond-
1
ence for these years bears witness to his interest in public af-
fairs and to his opportunity to learn of them from men whose facil-
2
ities for observation were superior to his own. Still more im-
portant, perhaps, is Washington's statement that his house might
be compared to a well resorted tavern** for "strangers and people
3
of first distinction." We may conclude that he made good use of
the opportunity to elicit from these travellers information as to
the political conditions in the parts of the country with which
4
they were familiar.
1
Washington's "Writings,'* X-II.
2
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, et cetera.
3
Washington to his mother. Mount Vernon, February 15,
1787; nvritings," XI, p. 117.
4
The weight of the evidence seems against literal inter-
pretation of Washington's assertion to Jefferson, in a letter of
August ist, 1787, that he was "too much secluded from the world
to know with certainty" public affairs. ("Writings," XI, p. 51).
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The first sentence in the paragraph quoted is important
as bearing witness to the existence of a reaction counter to that
against the Executive which had followed the outbreak of the Revo-
lution. At that time the Governors had been in ill repute as hav-
1
ing ••too much flavour of royalty and high prerogative,** and as
being the 'detested agents of royalty.'* The political disinte-
gration, (and the evils resulting therefrom), which followed the
War, were well calculated to disgust many people with the existing
order of things, and to dispose them to look towards the opposite
3
extreme for reform.
The expression **Even respectable characters " is one
which has a double suggestion; that monarchical tendencies existed
among persons whom Washington considered "respectable,** and also
among others whom he did not honor with this term. One is some-
what embarrassed by the absence of an explanation by Washington
as to his use of the term in this connection, but considering
that he was an aristocrat, a "typical English country gentleman,"
one may suspect that the term has more connection with class dis-
tinctions than with moral categories. On this assumption the
phrase suggests the question, **Have we evidence that monarchical
tendencies did exist among both the classes and the masses at
this time?"
As to popular sentiment on the subject, much may be said
1
Fiske, "Critical Period," p. 66.
E
Ibid., p. 67.
Compare Washington, ''Writings, " XI, p* 55.
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on both sides. One may ohoose between Franklin's opinion that
there is '•a natural inclination'* in the raasoos of mankind to king-
ly government, as giving more ''the appearanoe of equality among
1
citizens,'* and Beveridge'e conclusion that Tom Paine 'e political
philosophy exerted a powerful influence over "^the people'* at this
a
Deriod, and made them hostile to any restraint by government.
3
This subject is discussed more fully in a later chapter.
Certain respectable persons, friends of Washington,
entertained opinions which might have savored of monarchy to him.
He may have regarded Jay's desire for a strong centralized govern-
ment as such. The actual draft drawn up by Jay, some months later,
provided for a "governor-general limited in his prerogatives and
duration," who, together with a council should have a negative on
4
the legislature. It also included a senate to hold office for
life. Hamilton, too, a regular correspondent of Washington
throughout these years, may have expressed aorae ideas of the type
of those in the plan he later presented to the Convention, v/hich
5
were considered monarchical by many. Washington may have known
1
June 2; Farrand I, p. 83.
S
Severidge, ''Marshall,'* I, pp. 288-289.
3
Below, Chap. VII.
4
Jay to Y/ashington, January 7, 1787, Jay's "correspond-
ence," III, p. 227. Jay also says, "Shall we have a king? Hot in
my opinion while other experiments remain untried . Might we not
^iave a governor-general," etc. For a summary of Jay ' s plan see
North American Review, October, 1827. p. 263.
5
See below, chaps, IV-V,pp.ii,5 l-5i.
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of monarchioal tendencies in Gorhara's opinions, either from per-
sonal aoouaintance with him, or through friends, if, indeed,
1
(xorham did entertain suoh views, as there is reason to "believe,
A discussion of monarchical tendencies at this time
would be incomplete v;ithout a consideration of the Cincinnati.
Organized "to perpetuate the friendships formed in the war, to
deliberate in secret on the welfare of the country , "^^and for cer-
3
tain charitable purposes, they soon fell into popular disfavor,
due to the suspicion that they were aristocratic and even raonar-
4
chioal in their tendencies. While many democratic souls feared
and hated them, there is evidence that loyal Englishmen hailed
5
them gladly as a means to the restoration of English rule.
Washington would not admit that there were any grounds
6
for such suspicions, although he did urge prudence upon the society.
M. Otto, on the other hand, writing to the French Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, in June, 1787, said that the Cincinnati,
as public creditors, desired a '^solid government" and proposed
"to cast all the States into a single mass and place at their head
the gallant Washington with all the prerogatives and powers of a
1
See below, chap. II.
Z
Bassett, "History of the United States," p. 239.
3
Y/ashington*s "Y/orks," ZI, p. 15.
4
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
5
Humphreys to Hamilton, Se-otember 16, 1787; Hamilton's
"Works," I^ p. 443.
6
Washington's "Writings," XI, pp. 14-15.
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orowned head." They even threatened "to bring about this revolu-
tion themselves, by foroe, as soon as they snould be oonvinoed of
the uselessness of the present convention," He added, however,
that this projeot was "too extravagant to merit the least disoua-
sion," since the society was "too feeble and unpopular to make any
1
impression."
Gerry, at the time of the Convention, professed to sus-
pect the order of no bad motives, although he feared their in-
fluence. If the election of the chief magistrate be left to
the people, their ignorance, he urged, "would put it in the power
of some one set of men dispersed tlirough the Union & acting in
Concert to delude them into any appointment... [S]uch a Society ..•
existed in the Order of the Cincinnati, They were respectable,
United, and influential... His respect for the characters compos-
ing this society could not blind him to the danger & impropriety"
3
of the election falling into their hands "in every instance."
1
Writer's translation of M, Otto's letter to Comte de
Montraorin, June 10, 1787; Farrand, III, pp. 43-44.
2
M.
,
July 25; Parrand, II, p. 114. [In references to
Parrand's "Reports," I and II, the capital letter refers to the
author of the particular record used. Thus M. is for Madison's
notes, Y, for Yates', K. for King's, Mc. for McHenry's, P, for
Pierce's, Pa. for Paterson's, H. for Hamilton's, P. for Pinckney's,
Ma. for Mason's Hotes, and J. for the official Journal. (See
Introduction" Parrand, I). The quotations are not necessarily
the speakers' own words, but those ascribed to them by the
records].

3B
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There ia one instanoe which bears striking witness to
the existence, in 1782, of a desire for a monarchy among some mem-
bers of the army, namely, the Nicola letter which was written by
a man who later was a charter member of the Pennsylvania branch of
1
the Cincinnati. Colonel Lewis Micola was on terms of intimacy
with V/ashington at the time of the affair, and seemingly a go-
between v;ho communicated to the cora:iiander-in-chief the complaints
Z
which the officers made against Congress,
The reason for writing the letter was explained as the
fear that Congress would fail properly to remunerate the army, al-
ready in a wretched condition due to congressional neglect. The
writer then discussed various forms of government, concluding that
republics' were inferior to all in regard to establishing stability
and securing individual rights. He inferred that America could
never hope to become a prosperous nation under a republican govern-
ment, and pointed to the English form as the most successful the
3
world had ever seen.
After considering, in some detail, the financial oper-
ations of the war and the resulting burdens of taxation, he added
that •*This must have shown to all, and to military men in partic-
ular, the weakness of republics" and the contrast to "the exertions
1
new Int. Enc, ZYII, p. 135.
a
Sparks* note, Washington's "V/ri tings , '* Z, p. 23.
3
Ibid.
I
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the army had been able to make by being under a proper head.'*
For this reason he had "little doubt that v.hen the benefits of a
mixed government" were duly considered, suoh would be "readily
adopted." And, finally, Nioola expressed the belief that it would
be "unoontroverted, " that the same abilities which had led the
American army through seemingly insurmountable difficulties to
"victory and glory," would be most likely to direct the people
1
"in the smoother paths of peace."
That Nicola was v/ell aware of a formidable opposition to
monarchical forms is seen in his admission that, since some people
had "so connected the ideas of tyranny and monarchy, as to find
it very difficult to separate them," it might "be requisite to
give the head of such a constitution" as he proposed, "some title
apparently more moderate." However, even such an Augustan con-
cession to the forms of republicanism was meant to be but temporary
for he added "but if all other things were once adjusted, I be-
lieve strong arguments might be produced for admitting the title
of King, which I conceive would be attended with some material
3
advantages.
"
1
Sparks* note, Washington's "Writings," i, p. 23.
2
Hicola may have had in mind the title "Stadtholder.
"
(See below, chap. VI). A study of the supposed movement to make
the Duke de Broglie some such official in the Revolution might
be made in this connection.
3
Sparks* note. Ibid., pp. 2, 3-24.
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It seems reasonable to believe, as does Sparks, that
Colonel Nioola was not advancing this plan wholly on his own
responsibility, but was the spokesman of '^a party in the arrny,
neither small in number, nor insignificant in character, prepared
to second and sustain a measure of this kind, which they conceived
necessary to strengthen the civil power, draw out the resources
1
of the country, and establish a durable government.**
Washington's reply to lUcola's letter is quoted at some
length since it so clearly and forcefully expresses his attitude
on the subject,
'*¥ith ... great surprise ... I have read ... the senti-
ments you have submitted to my perusal. Be assured, ... no occur-
rence in the course of the war has given me more painful sensa-
tions, than your information of there being such ideas existing
in the army, as you have expressed, and I must vie?/ with abhorrence
and reprehend with severity. S'or the present the conmunicatn of
them will rest in my own bosom, unless some further agitation of
the matter shall make a disclosure necessary.
"I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct
oould have given encouragement to an address, which to me seems
big with the greatest mischiefs, that can befall my country. If
I am not deceived in the knowledge of myself, you could not have
found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable
Let me conjure you ..• if you have any regard for your Country,
concern for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish
1
Sparks' note. Ibid., p. 24.
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these thoughts from your mind, and. never oofiununioate , as from
1
yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like nature.**
Despite Washington's promise of secreoy suoh an affair
could hardly have been kept quiet, especially since it must have
involved a number of persons at the start, as is suggested in the
phrase •*or any one else," as well as by the general circumstances
of the case. It probably added force to the ideas of outsiders
that the Cincinnati favored monarchy. On the other hand, it may
be noted that any knowledge of the letter which Nicola's superiors
may have had did not prevent his promotion to the rank of briga-
2
dier-general the next year.
3
The movement instigated by the Hewburgh address, which
was skillfully terminated by Washington before it became actually
destructive or even theoretically constructive , was suggestive of
the germs of rebellion against Congress which existed in the army.
The disgraceful flight of Congress before the mutinous soldiers
4
in Pniladelphia was another incident which may have contributed
to the idea that the army was anti-congressional and therefore,
perhaps, monarchical.
1
Washington to Nicola, Ivlay 22, 1782; Yi/ashington*
s
'Writings," X, pp. 21-22.
2
New Int. Enc, XVII, p. 135.
3
Bassett, "Hist, of the U. 3.," p. 224. It may be noted
that while Washington greatly respected the army officers in general,
there was at least one character connected with the Newburgh ad-
dress v/hom he probably would not have complimented with the adjec-
tive "respectable,** namely. General Gates.
4
Ibid., pp. 224-225.
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Washington's exclamation that the esteblichment of a
monarchy v;ould be a triumph for the "advocates of despotism" sug-
gests the question as to contemporaneous opinion abroad on the
best form of government for the United States. In a letter to
the Chevalier de la Luzerne, written the same day as the letter to
Jay under consideration, Washington expresses his conviction that
Europeans have been misled by the fact that "all the unfavorable
features have been much heightened by the medium of the English
newspapers, through which they have been represented."
Josiah Tucker, the famous dean of Gloucester, said,
"as to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising
empire under one head, whether republican or monarchical, it is
one of the idlest and most visionary notions that ever was con-
2
ceived,"
Although George III expressed officially the hope that
America would escape the evils which always had resulted in past
3
history from throwing off a monarchical government, it is easy
to detect behind his words not only a hope , but an expectation of
the contrary event. King George's stubborn insistence on the
continuance of the War, when many of his advisers would have given
it up, leads one to believe that he may not have considered the
treaty of 1783 as final, and th&t he anticipated a repentant return
of the erring colonies.
1
Mount Yernon, August 1, 1786; Washington's "tlritings,"
ZI, p. 50.
2
Fiske, "Critical Period," pp. 57-58.
3
Ibid., p. 58.
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Even Frederick the Great, a friend to Americana , con-
tended that "no republic ... had ever long existed on so great a
soala" as necessitated by the extent of the colonies, and that a
1
monarchy would be the only alternative to disunion.
The letter to Jay furnishes further evidence as to V/ash-
ington's own opinion on the subject. His exclamation tiiat a re-
turn to monarchy would be "irrevocable and tremendous" indicates
that he felt that such an event would not be merely an experiment
which might, in the end, strengthen democracy, but rather that it
would be a case of looking the gates against liberty and throwing
away the key. His reference to the operation of these monarchical
tendencies as bringing "consequences we have but too much reason
to apprehend," shows that he considered the introduction of monar-
chy as more than a mere possibility. And, finally, in the passion-
ate expression of his hope that measures may be taken to avert this
"calamity," there is a suggestion of taking definite steps to so
remedy the existing evils that monarchical tendencies would no
longer find a field for operation,
s tSome months later, under date of March 31 , 1787, Wash-
ington wrote Madison a letter containing a passage which is doubly
interesting to a student of monarchical tendencies, "I am fully
of opinion that those, who lean to a monarchical government, have
either not consulted the public mind, or that they live in a region,
which (the levelling principles in v/hich they were bred being en-
tirely eradicated) is much more productive of monarchical ideas,
1
Fiske, "Critical Period," p. 58.
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than are to be found in the southern states, where, froa the habit-
ual (list inot ions whioh have always existed among the people, one
would have expected the first generation and the most rapid growth
of them. I am also clear, that, even admitting the utility, nay
necessity of the form, yet that the period is not arrived for
adopting the change without shaking the peace of this country to
1
its foundation." He proceeds to suggest that a change from the
fundamentals of the present system can never be accomplished,
without civil discord, unless a thorough reform of the existing
2
system be tried and found to fail.
The first point of interest is his exoneration of the
Southern States from entertaining desires for monarchical govern-
ment. The reference to '*levelling principles" makes it quite cer-
tain that he had New England in mind as he wrote, for he had al-
ready, on other occasions, expressed his dislike of the lack of
3
respect for rank and position in that part of the country. This
point is further borne out by two letters written by William Gray-
th th
son, Jfcy 24 and 29 respectively, who attributes "high-
toned" ideas to "the delegates from the Eastward,'* although with
the belief that their position was not truly representative of
4
that of their constituents.
1
"Writings," XI, p. 133.
2
Ibid.
, pp. 132-133.
3
See Washington's "?/ritings
,
III, pp. 17, 97.
4
Grayson to Madison, May 24, 1787, and to Monroe, May
29"^^, 1787; Farrand,III, p. 26 and p. 30 respectively.

-14-
A oareful reading of the passage reveals further the
possibility that Washington's horror of Monarchy had materially
s t
diminished in the months since his letter of August 1 , to Jay.
This change may have been produced by his anxiety over the dis-
orders in Massachusetts, concerning the progress of which he had
1
been informed, from time to time, by General Knox, Although he
seemed to have been convinced that Ma jor-General Lincoln had set-
2
tied the difficulty successfully, he must have felt that similar
disorders might break out again, there or elsewhere, in the ab-
3
sence of more constructive treatment.
To look ahead for a moment, Washington's position as
president of the Convention precluded his participation in the de-
bates. The last part of the quotation just made v/ould indicate
that 7/hat influence he could exert in the Convention would be not
for extreme measures, but those strong enough to remedy the worst
of the existing political ills, without going far enough to risk
civil discord.
1
See Washington's letter to Knox, Dec. 26, 1786,
"Writings," Vol. XI, pp. 103-104, and to Lincoln, March 23, 1787;
Ibid., p. 127.
2
Ibid.
3
For a profession that the existing form of government
was adequate to deal with disorders, like those in Iifessachusetts,
see Minot, ''Insurrections in Massachusetts," p. 192.
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11
CHAPTER II
prince Henry of Prussia Invited to Become King of
the United States.
The discovery, some years ago, in the Royal Prussian
Archives at Chariot tentiurg, of a copy of a letter written hy
Prince Henry to General Steuben in April, 1786,^ reawakened a
spectre of monarchy which John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, in
2
1885, pronounced laid forever. This letter permits an interpre-
tation which tends to verify the rumor, once rife, that Henry of
Prussia was asked to become "King of the United States." The
tale is given a flavor of respectability by its connection with
such names as Rufus King and James Monroe, yet is no more than a
rumor, for King does not give it on his own authority but merely
says he received it from Colonel Miller, who claimed to have re-
ceived it from President Monroe. Monroe, in turn, said he had it
3
from General Armstrong and that General Hull had the papers.
On the other hand, it is possible to show that various individuals
in the chain of transmission had opportunities to know of the
Henry of Prussia affair, if it ever took place.
1
Krauel discusses this letter in an article "Prince
Henry of Prussia," in the Am. Hist. Rev., Oct. 1911, pp. 44-51.
E
King's "Life and Correspondence," VI, p. 647. Yet King
did not definitely deny that such a proposition had been made, nor
that he had some part in it , but rather excused the existence of
such tendencies in the Convention period, according to quotation
by T . H. Benton, printed in Farrani, III, p. 466.
3
Memorandum of King, May 10, 1824; King's "Life and Cor-
respondence," VI, pp. 643-644. If the papers referred to ever ex-
isted they may have perished with other of Hull's belongings, in
the Detroit fire of 1812.
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Colonel James Miller, a soldier and politician of the
period, may have become known to King through King's son John, who
was present with Miller at Liindy^s Leine and greatly admired his
heroism on that occasion. Although King's correspondence, as
published, contains no letter from Miller, the fact does not nec-
essarily prove that King did not know him and receive from aim
the story to which reference is made in the memorandxun of May 10th.
James Monroe served three years in the Congress under
the Confederation, just before the change to the new government.^
In a letter to General Jackson, in 1816, he wrote that while in
Congress he saw indications that "some of the leaders of the fed-
eral party entertained principles unfriendly to our system of gov-
ernment and that they meant to work a change in it, by taking
advantage of favorable circumstances It was an epoch
at which the views of men were most likely to unfold themselves,
as, if anything favorable to a higher toned government was to be
obtained, that was the time No daring attempt was ever
made, because there was no opportunity for it."^ Apparently,
then, Monroe, although in Congress with Gorham at the time the in-
vitation was supposed to have been sent, knew nothing of the
affair at the time. The letter does, however, indicate that Monroe
would have been much interested in such a charge as Armstrong
made*
1
King's "Life and Correspondence," V, p. 408.
2
Letter of Dec. 14, 1816; Monroe's "Writings," V, p. 343.
3
Ibid., pp. 342-343.
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Two facts in Armstrong»s career may have had some
connection with the caae in hand. He was the author of the New-
burgh address, and as such disgusted with the weakness of Congress
under the Confederation."^ He was Secretary of 7/ar during 1813
2
and 1814, and in this capacity may have learned much about Hull's
affairs, during the court martial of the latter. He had, however,
an opportunity for more direct infornation concerning the Prince
Henry affair than he could have obtained from Hull, for he spent
the winter of 1787-88 in the same lodging-house as General Steuben,
who is supposed to have transmitted aorham»s letter to the prince.
^
There seems to be no evidence, outside Armstrong's
assertion, that Hull had papers that proved the reality of the
Prince Henry affair. Steuben may have suggested something of
the sort to Armstrong in the winter they spent beneath the same
roof. The test of the story itself by the standards of probability
involves a study of three persons, Gorham who is supposed to have
written the letter, Steuben who is supposed to have transmitted
it, and Prince Henry who is supposed to have received it.
Gorham, three years a member of the Congress of the Con-
federation, (its president in 1786),^ and later a prominent mem-
ber of the
1
Fiske, "Critical Period," p. 109; also New Int. Enc.
II, p. 157.
2
New Int. Enc. II, p. 157.
3
Kapp, "Life of Steuben," p. 543.
4
William Pierce, "Character Sketches of Delegates to the
Federal Convention," Parrand,lII, p. 88.
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Pederal Convention, was "much In the esteem of his oountry-men."
Hl8 activities In the Federal Convention bore witness to his
earnest desire for a more powerful central government for, on the
2
whole, his was a "hlghtoned" point of view at that time. In all
prohablllty his sentiments were mxoh the same before the calling
of the Convention, with the exception that he might have felt
forced to look to more stringent remedies before the Convention
appeared as a possible solution of the problem. Even so, would
ha have committed himself to such a measure In view of his official
position in Congress? I believe that this question may be ans-
wered In the affirmative, since the guarded terms In which Prince
Henry couched his reply prove that the original communication
was made in a very confidential way. Granted that Gorham had
entertained such views, his influence on potential monarchical
tendencies In the convention cannot be estimated by his speeches
3
in its sessions. A man who was "perspicuous and full" in debate
must have been a central figure in the Informal discussions which
doubtless took place among the delegates out of session.^ Al-
though his "very good sense" would have restrained him from
1
William Pierce, "Character Sketches of Delegates to the
Federal Convention," Farrand, III, p, 87.
Z
For Gorham' s stand on various measures see "General
Index;" Farrand.III, pp. 660-661.
3
William Pierce, Ibid,, p. 88.
4
See for example, McHenry's accounts of meetings of the
Maryland Delegation; Farrand,II, pp. 190-192, and 210-212.
5
William Pierce, "Character Sketches;" Parrand^III,
p. 87.
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utterlng sentiments which he felt would shook the majority of
members, he probably would have supported a monarchical proposition
had Buoh a proposal received any general approval.
Grorham might have expected that Henry would be interes-
ted In such a proposition. This point is beat approached through
Steuben's interest in the matter, since it was doubtless he who
gave Gorham, or the group In sympathy with him, direct Information
concerning this prince whom many Americans admired as one of the
military heroes of the age,^ A consideration of Steuben's long
controversy with Congress, which treated him with contemptible
ingratitude and injustice, convinces one that he had reason to
desire a more responsible and competent form of government.
Moreover, Steuben felt much insulted by the failure of Congress
to appoint him to the position of Secretary of War, which fell
vacant in 1783. Considering his services in reorganizing the
American army at a critical period of the war, he rightly resented
the insinuation that, as a "foreigner" he could not be trusted
with the standing army of four hundred men. Steuben's activi-
ties in New York, where he was associated with Hamilton,'* prove
1
Krauel, "Prince Henry," p. 46, foot note.
2
Kapp, "Life of Steuben," chap. 2ZV.
3
Ibid., p. 526.
4
For the basis of his friendship with Hamilton see
Kapp "Life of Steuben," p. 562. For his Federalist sympathies
see Ibid., p. 684.
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his interest in American politics; his writings on the history
of the executive in various forms of government ahow that
this Interest centered especially on the head of the state.
^
Although it is probahle that Steuben did not believe that Henry
2
would accept the position of head of the American state, he
might well have wished to be the means of trsinsmitting such a com
plimentary offer to his friend and former commander. It
seems reasonable to oelieve that it was an expression by Steuben
of his confidence that Henry was the person who could best fill
the position of king, should it be created, which called forth
Henry's words, "Vos bonnes intentions sont bien dignes de mon
estime, elles me paraissent I'effet d*un zfele que je voudrais
4
reconnaitre." 'iifhat reason had Steuben to believe that Henry
would be, at least, interested in a monarchical constitution
for the United States, and what chance was there that the prince
might have accepted such an offer? The Marquis de Bouill^,
an intimate friend of Henry, who was seeing him frequently at
1
Kapp "Life of Steuben," p, 584.
Z
See below, page 21.
3
Kapp "Life of Steuben," p, 60-61.
4
Quoted by Krauel, "Prince Henry," p. 47.
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about this time, reoords that Henry's discuaaions "roulalent
sur la politique, I'histoire, princepalement celle dea dvdnements
2
modernes." Steuben probably knew of this interest of Henry of
Prussia in contemporary history and. government.^ According to
the Mulligan anecdote, Steuben felt little hope of an accept-
ance of the American crown by the prince, for he said that Henry
"would not have the patience to stay three days" among such
4
people as the Americans, According to King's memorandum, Steuben
stated that Henry had been offered the crown by Gorham and had
refused for the reason that "the Americans had shown so much
determination agt, their old King, that they would not readily
5
submit to a new one."
1
De Bouill^, "Souvenirs," p. 30.
8
Ibid., p. 3E.
3
Krauel , in his discussion of the letter, suggests
that Henry was urging the Americans to make no change without the
concurrence of their "vrais allies," the French, because the
importance of a European alliance loomed much larger to states-
men of that day than to one looking back upon the period. (Krauel,
"Prince Henry," pp. 49-60.) Some new light is thrown on this
part of Henry's letter by a consideration of de Bouill^'s refer-
ences to the prince's sympathy with French ideas which he says
were so pronounced that "c'^tait comme anti -Henri que I'on dtait
A Berlin antifrancai s. " (De Bouill^, "Souvenirs," p. 48.)
4
The Mulligan Anecdote is not well substantiated, since
Mulligan was eighty-six years old when he told the tale to Kapp.
It is not even certain, though probable, that Ji/fulligan himself was
Kapp's source. Se Kapp, "Life of Steuben ," f)p. xii , 584.
5
King's Memorandum, "Life and Writings," XI, p. 643.
I
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A more real reason may have been that Henry had long
manifested an Intention to rule under the name of hie nephew, when
the latter should suooeed to the Prussian throne. The death of
Frederick the Great, the news of whloh had probably not reached
America by November 2nd, (the date In whioh the elusive letter to
Henry was written), had given the prinoe his ohanoe. However, if
one accepts De Boullle's statement that Henry failed to realize
this ambition and retired from court In the spring of '87,
"gemlsaant sur la chose publique, qu* 11, regarda des lors oomme
2perdue," the suggestion may be made that had the Federal Con-
vention, (already In session before Henry's answer reached America),
decided upon a monarchical form of government, Prinoe Henry of
Prussia would have been a candidate for the title role.
1
De Boullle, "Souvenirs," p, 48.
2
Ibid,, p. 48,
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CHAPTER III
The Convention, Its Purposes, Its Decision for
a Single Executive,
The theory of free governments prohably contains no
problem more difficult than that of the constitution and powers
1
of the executive. In the Federal Convention "the subject under-
went a very elaborate discussion ••• with much diversity of opin-
2,3
ion.** There had been no national executive under the Confedera-
tion, the whole powers of government being vested in Congress, and,
during the recess, in a still feebler body, the committee of the
4
States, appointed by Congress. Thus, "It was a new officer whom
they were creating, and he loomed all the larger in their eyes
that from the ... limitations of their experience they were com-
pelled to think of him in terms of monarchy, the only form of
5
national executive power they knew.**
In order to appreciate the purposes of the Convention,
1
Compare Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution," 51410.
2
Story, ^1411.
3
A, H. Everett, in his "Life of Patrick Henry," p. 360,
says the framers of the Constitution were "so entirely absorbed
by the question of the relative influence of the states in Congress,
that they felt comparatively little interest in the executive de-
partment, and continued almost mechanically the form in use under
the colonial system." This view is not borne out by the facts.
4
Story, §1413.
5
Parrand, "Praming of the Constitution," p. 162.
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and the means by which the delegates sought to oarry them out, it
is necessary to know how long a duration was expected for the plan
to he evolved. Some members, as Hamilton, felt that this was the
1
time '•to decide for ever the fate of Republican government • •» King
asserted that it was *^o scheme of a day'* calculated to merely
2
••postpone the hour of Danger." Others, while perhaps agreeing
with this sentiment in its broader aspects, believed that the exact
form in which these principles found expression was a temporary
expedient. Thus Lansing, arguing for strict definition of their
commissions, said that if the resulting plan should prove defective,
3
the people would **entrust a future convention again to amend it."
Mason was convinced that a second Convention would '•know more of the
sense of the x)eople, and be able to provide a system more consonant
4
to it,'* and Ellsworth advocated halfway measures, on grounds of
caution, since, he said, '•The other half may be added, when the
5
necessity shall be more fully experienced. *•
The idea of a second Convention was strongly opposed by
Charles Pinckney who said that the deputies to it, "coming together
under the discordant impressions of their constituents," would
6
never agree.
1
M. , June 26 i Farrand,!, p. 424.
2
K, , June 19; Ibid., p. 332.
3
Y. , June 20; Ibid., p. 345.
4
M.
,
September 15; Ibid., II, p. 632. Randolph held
similar views.
5
M. , June 29-, Ibid., I, p. 469.
6
M.
,
September 15; E'arrand,II, p. 632.
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Madison believed that "leavg. [leaving] future amendmente
1
to posterity" was a "dangerous Doctrine,** oiting as proof the
cases of the failure of attempts to reform the Amphiotyonio League
2
and the Constitution of the United Netherlands. He also asserted
that "the fear of Innovation, and the Hue Ss Cry in favor of the
3
Liberty of the people v/ill prevent the necessary Reforms.'* "We
should run every risk in trusting to future amendments," said
4
Hamilton, on this same day.
Madison thought the general desire in Convention v/as for
a system which should "last for ages" and that they should, at the
5
very outset, provide for "the changes which ages [would] produce,"
The same sentiment was expressed by Wilson in the following words:
"7/hen we are laying the foundation of a building, which is to last
for ages, and in which millions are interested, it ought to be well
6
laid." This thought for the distant future proves that although
1
Gerry, on June 5, had expressed the argument for amend-
ments thus, "... the novelty & difficulty of the experiment re-
quires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would
also give intermediate stability to the Govt." M; i'arrand,I,p.l82.
2
K. , June 29j Farrand.I, p. 478.
3
Ibid.
4
M. , June 29j Parrand,!, p. 467.
5
M. , June 26? Farrand,I, p. 422.
6
Y,j June 25} Ibid., p. 413. See also Madison's words,
M.
,
August 7, FarrandjII, pp. 203-204, and those of Morris,
M.
,
July 5; FarrandjI, p. 529.
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their trust in Washington perhaps influenced the powers given to
the President, the members of the Convention were attempting to
look beyond his administration.
Quite unlike these viev/s were others to the effect that
the present plan should be but a temporary expedient. Thus Wash-
ington said, even admitting the utility and necessity of a monar-
chical form, "The period is not arrived for adopting the change
1
without shaking the peace of this country to its foundation,"
There is just a suggestion here that he believed that such a period
would arrive eventually, Gerry, speaking on centralization said
the community was "not yet ripe" for such a measure.
Still others believed that from the general trend of
human affairs or from the nature of the plan of the Convention the
United States would eventually become a monarchy. This idea was
advanced quite calmly by Franklin, together with the advice that
3
the most that the Convention could do was to postpone such an event.
4 5
Randolph and Mason could not view the situation in such a philo-
sophical manner, and refused to support the Constitution on the
grounds that it would end either in monarchy or a tyrannical
aristocracy.
1
Washington to Madison, March 31, 1787; Washington's
'Writings," XI, p. 132.
2
M. , June 2', Parrand, I, p. 80.
3
M. , June 2*, Parrand,!, p. 83.
4
M.
,
September 10» Farrand,II, p. 564; also letter from
R. H, Lee, October 16, 1787, Conway, "Edmund Randolph," p. 86.
5
M. , June 4-, Farrand, I, p. 101, and M. , September 15;
Farrand, II, p. 631.
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A more specific form was given to this anticipation by
Madison, on June 29*^, namely that, *»A standing military force,
with an overgrown executive will not long be safe companions to
1
liberty." Another source of danger was the doctrine of "Implied
Powers." Although expressed by Hamilton as early as 17Q0, and by
2
Morris immediately after the Convention, it was not a subject
of debate in the Convention itself. Hamilton and a few kindred
spirits very probably had it in mind and may, in this sense, be
said to have "insidiously" laid the "foundations of a future
Monarchy," despite Mr. Baldwin's assertion that there was no appear-
3
ance of such intentions on the part of any member of the Convention.
The Convention was authorized "for the sole ..... purpose
of revising the Articles of Confederation" and of reporting to
Congress and the state legislatures such provisions as they should
agree necessary to "render the federal constitution adequate to
4
the exigencies of government & the preservation of the Union."
In Ti'ashington' s words, the ob;)ect was to remedy "the situation of
1
M; Farrand,I, p. 465.
2
Shea," Life of Hamilton',^ P. vii: for Hamilton's letter to
Duane, September 3, 1780, see 'HVorks," I, p. 151. It was in oper-
ation within a few years after the Convention to such an extent
that many were apparently sincere in the belief that by Jefferson's
election in 1801 "this country had been rescued from the Eng-
lish monarchical system which his opponents were striving to estab-
lish." Life and Writings of John Dickinson," p. 284.
3
Ezra Stiles' Diary, December, 1787, Farrand, STaming of
the Constitution," p. 162; Parrand, III, p. 169.
4
Resolution of Congress, February 21, 1787; Farrand,
III, p. It.
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the general government" which was ''shaken to its foundation, and
1
liable to be overturned by every blast.'* In Madison's fuller
descriotion it was to prevent "violations of the laws of nations &
of Treaties, "encroachments on the federal authority, and "tres-
passes of the States on each other;" and to secure a "good in-
2
ternal legislation & administration to the particular States."
A study of the Convention records shows that the members were, in
general, "united in their objects," but not, as some hoped in the
early days of the work, "equally united in the means of attaining
3,4
them."
Comments on the general diversity of opinion in the Con-
vention throw light on the special consideration as to opinion on
the Executive. Since '*a very large Field" opened before them
"without a single straight or eligible Road" that had been "troddan
5
by the feet of Nations'* it was "to be expected" that there would
6
be a "great diversity of sentiment," and much ''groping ... in the
7
dark to find political truth." One cannot deny that at times the
1
Washington to Jefferson, May 30, 1787? Farrand, III, p. 31.
^ th
Madison's speech of June 19 , M; Farrand, I, pp. 316-319.
3
Reference to Dickinson's opinion in letter of Benjamin
Rush to Richard Price, June Z, 1787; Farrand, III, p. 33.
4
It would seem from the facts that the Philadelphia paper
which reported the unanimity so great that it had been proposed to
call the Convention room "Unanimity Hall" must have been "inspired."
See Extract from "Pennsylvania Packet;" Farrand, III, p. 60.
5
C. Delegates to Gov. Caswell, June 14, 1787; Farrand,
III, p. 46.
6
William Samuel Johnson to his son, June E7, 1787;
Farrand, III, p. 50.
7
Franklin, in Convention, June 28; M; Farrand, I, p. 451,
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debatera reveuled "the spirit of political negotiators" rather than
1
that of a"band of brothers." Yet one may conclude that diversity
of sentiment was inevitable, and if 'Teeble minds [were]for feeble
measures & some for patching the old garment. and] vigorous minds,,.
advocated] a high toned Monarchy^* these extremes were necessary to
2
a result which had the advantages of moderation,
Piske believes that most of the delegates were not clear
as to whether they were "merely to patch up the articles of confed-
eration, or to strike out into a new and very different path.
There were a few who entertained far-reaching purposes; the rest
3
were intelligent critics rather than constructive thinkers," He
further believes that the Uew Jersey plan **more nearly represented
what most of the delegates supposed they were sent to do" than did
any other plan, and that it was only the fact that it was not pre-
sented until the delegates had become accustomed to certain radical
4
ideas that prevented its acceptance. On the other hand, Seorge
st
Mason, writing from Philadelphia on May 21 , 1787, believes that
"the most prevalent idea" at that time was for "a total change of
the federal system," and the institution of a national executive
5
separate from the legislative and judiciary. Very likely Mason
1
Gerry, June 29; M; Farrand,I, p. 467.
2
Nicholas Gilman to Joseph Gilman, July 31, 1787;
Farrand,III, p. 66.
3
Piske, "Critical Period," p. 223.
4
Parrand, "Framing of the Constitution," p. 89.
5
liason to Arthur Lee, May 21, 1787;
Parrand, III, p. 24.
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had talked with some of the members who "entertained far-reaching
purposes. •*
The effective purposes of the delegates were limited by
their interpretation of their commissions. After considerable dis-
cussion they decided that the Convention was not limited to the form
of the Articles of Confederation, and for the following reasons:
first, that the •fiat" was not to be in the Convention but in the
1
people, and second, that even if their powers were limited, public
2
welfare justified overstepping the limits in such a crisis. Accord-
ing to the first mode of reasoning, any monarchical propositions
which might be made v;ould be limited only by the prospect of non-
acceptance by the people; according to the second, the Convention
might act contrary to the popular interpretation of commissions
if they were sure that their action would in the end promote the
public welfare.
An adoption of the first resolution of the New Jersey
3
iplan would have precluded any hopes of "monarchical" forms, for it
1
See M. , June 16; Farrand,!, p. 253; Y. , June 18;
Farrand,!^ p. 295.
2
Y. , June 16; Parrand, I, p. 262.
^ th
The Pinckney plan, introduced May 29 , had no effect
except as it may have been referred to by the Committee of Detail.
It provided for a single executive with considerable power, chosen
annually by the Senate and House of Delegates. See "Committee of
Detail," Farrand II, pp. 134 f.
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Droposed merely a revision, correction, and enlargement of the
1
Articles of Confederation. The way to a departure from the exist-
th
ing form was opened, on May 30 , by the adoption of the following
resolution; "that a national Governt. ought to be established con-
Z
sisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary,"
It is obvious that men who believed in a plural execu-
tive would not countenance monarchical tendencies. There was con-
siderable opt)osition to unity in this department, in fact, the
th ^
Virginia plan, as presented May 29 , had been indefinite on the
point, for the excellent reason that the Virginia delegation could
4 3^
not agree on it. The issue had to be fairly faced on June 1
when lylr. Wilson, seconded by Mr. Charles Pinckney, moved that the
Executive consist of a single person. The silence which followed
was relieved by Franklin's observation that this was an important
point deserving discussion. Thereupon Mr. Rutledge, after
1
M; Parrand,I, p. 24£.
2
M.
,
Itoy 30; farrand,I, p. 35.
3
M; Farrand,I, p. 21.
4
Randolph favored a plural executive, on the grounds
that unity in this department was "the foetus of monarchy" and that
"vigor, despatch & responsibility could be found in three as well
as in one man." M. , June 1; Farrand I, p. 66. Hote that Sherman's
op-Dosition to unity was that the Executive was merely "an institu-
tion for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect" and
accordingly the number should not be fixed, but left to the discre-
tion of the Legislature from time to time. M. , June 1; Farrand,
I, p. 65.
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deprecatlng the '^shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects"
expressed his preference for a single Executive, though without the
power of war and peace. Wilson expressed himself to be of similar
opinion, since a single magistrate would give the "most energy
1
dispatch and responsibility to the office."
Wilson denied that unity would be "the fetus of monarchy"
and contended that it would rather be the best guard against
2
tyranny. The question was then postponed "the Committee seeming
3
unprepared for any decision on it." When reopened the following
day Mr, Charles Pinckney's supposition that the reasons for unity
4
were so obvious that no member would oppose it proved ill founded,
5
for Randolph straightway corabatted it "with great earnestness."
th
Mr. Sherman on June 4 tried to pour oil on troubled waters by
suggesting that associating a council with the Executive was neces-
sary to win the people to a single Executive, Wilson, however.
1
M, , June 1; Farrand,I, p. 65.
2
Ibid.
, p. 66.
3
Ibid.
4
M. , June 2; Farrand, I, p. 88.
6
Ibid.
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replied that u Council more often covered than prevented malprac-
1
ticea. Gerry probably expressed Ihe opinion of many when he up-
held unity for the reason that a plurality would be "extremely in-
Z
convenient particularly in military matters." The question
was temporarily settled by a vote of 7 to 3 in favor of a single
3
executive.
th
Several weeks later, (July 17 ) , on the question to agree
to the report from the Committee of the V/hole House, "That a nation-
al Executive be instituted to consist of a Single Person," the vote
4
was 10 to in the affirmative. The last word on the subject had
not yet been said, however, for on July 24 , in the course of dis-
cussion on the mode of appointment, Mr. Williamson "did not like the
Unity in the Executive," preferring an executive power lodged in
three men, to more fairly represent the separate interests of the
5
three sections of the country. He further objected to a single
magistrate as being an "elective King" who would "spare no pains to
keep himself in for life, and ... lay a train for the succession of
6
his children."
?<hile the matter of executive powers had an important
1
M. , June 4; FarrandjI, p. 97.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
J., July 17; I'arrand,II, p. 22.
5
M.
,
July 24; Farrand,II, p. 100.
6
Ibid., p. 101.
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connection with the monarohical problem, the oonneotlon was not ao
clear in the minds of the delegates as that in the case of the
unity and tenure of the executive. Three questions for the future
at
research may be suggested at this point: 1 , To what extent did
the expectation that Washington then **at the height of his popular-
ity, "would be the first president affect the extent of power vested
in that office? 2"^^, What connection was there between the problem
of powers and other problems, such as the unity of the executive,
^ rd
for instance? 3 , What is the significance of the treatment of
the matter by the Committee of Detail, and of the Convention's
3
acceptance of the powers as increased by this Committee?
1
Parrand, "Framing of the Constitution," p. 163; Butler,
M, , June 4; Farrand,!, p. 100,
2
Farrand, '^Framing of the Constitution,** pp. 160-161.
3
See "Committee of Detail," General Index, Farrand,III,
p. 655.
I
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CHAPTER IV
Belief in the Existence of Monarchical Tendencies
in the Convention, and the Facts of the Case.
An attempt may now be made to answer the following ques-
tions: To what extent did a belief exist that the Convention con-
templated a monarchical government, and what justification was there
1
for this belief? During the summer months there were persistent
rumors to this effect, the most persistent form being that the
Bishop of Osnaburgh, second son of George III, was to be invited
2
to occupy the new throne. These rumors were positively denied in
at least one nev;sTDaper of the time, and also in numerous letters
3
written by members of the Convention. But these denials may be
suspected of being '*inspired"by interested persons, and the case
must rest on its own merits,
A study of the Convention records reveals nothing to
show that there was any thought of the British prince as a possi-
ble king of the United States. On the other hand, it is not possi-
1
It should be remembered, in this connection, that the
proceedings of the Convention were secret.
2
See extract from the Bew York **Daily Advertiser,"
Aug. 18, 1787; Farrand, II, p. 333, editor's footnote, and letter of
Sydney to Lord Dorchester, Sept. 14, 1787; Farrand, III, pp. 80-81.
3
Alexander Martin to Governor Caswell, Aug. 20, 1787;
Farrand, III, p. 73, and extract from the ''Pa. Journal," Aug. 22,
1787; Ibid., pp. 73-74.
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ble so readily to oonclude th&t the making of a monarchy wae not
in the minds of the delegates.
An appreciation of the oharaoter of the members of the
1
Convention is essential to an understanding of the problem just
suggested. On the one side is Beard's contention that the Consti-
tution was essentially class legislation in being "not the product
of an abstraction knov.-n as 'the whole people,' but of a group of
economic interests which must have expected beneficial results
2
from its adoption," If this were true, one would have a right to
conclude that the people themselves may have desired a monarchical
constitution, for the actual decision of a body of men pursuing
the interests of their own class v/ould be no certain indication of
the national will.
On the other side of the question one might accept the
assertion of a Pennsylvania newspaper that "such a body of enlight-
ened and honest men perhaps never before met for political purposes
3
in any country..." If this be deemed true, one concludes that
the Convention understood the national will and acted in accordance
therewith in forming a non-monarchical constitution. One may sus-
pect that this statement was inspired by powers within the Gonven-
1
See Pierce's "Character Sketches of Delegates to the
Federal Convention;" Farrand,III, pp. 87-97, and Beard, "Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution," chap. 5.
Z
Beard, Ibid., p. 17.
3
"Pa. Packet and Daily Advertiser, " Aug. 23, 1787;
J'arrand,III, p, 75.
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tion or having a personal Interest in the sucoess of the Convention,
and is not to be taken as the final word on the subject.
It is to be regretted that we have no direct expressions
of '•popular opinion** on the subject. However, what contemporary
expressions we have point towards a general confidence in the
ability and honesty of the delegates. Franklin pronounced it "the
1
most respectable Assembly he ever was in in his life.** M. Otto,
writing to Count de Montmorin, said that "on n*aura jamais vu, mSme
en Europe, une assembl6e plus respectable par les talens, les
connoissances , le dSsint^ressement et le patriotisme de oeux qui
2
la composeront. *• William Samuel Johnson, after the Convention had
been in session a month, wrote to his son that the members had
"evinced much solicitude for the public weal,**
Again, Elbridge Gerry said in Convention, **Tihatever
plan may be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of
respect to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from an appro-
4
bat ion of the plan itself," and George Mason wrote on June 1 ,
that "there are upon this Convention many gentlemen of the most
respectable abilities, and so far as I can discover, of the purest
5
intentions .
"
1
Ben.j&min Rush to Richard Price, June 2, 1787; Farrand
,
III, p. 33.
2
M. Otto to Comte de Montmorin, April 10, 1787; Farrand,
III, p. 15.
3.
William Samuel Johnson to his son, June 27, 1787;
Farrand, III, p. 50.
4
M. , June 26; Farrand, I, p. 425.
5
George Mason to George Mason, Jr., June 1, 1787; Farrand,
III, p. 32.
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While not wishing to take issue with the "Eoonomio
Interpretation,'* I should like to state as my o\vn conclusion that
the economic status of the "Constitutional Fathers'* did not effect
the results of the Convention nearly as much as it affected the
make-up of the Convention. In other words, the very fact that the
delegates were, in general, rather large property holders, proved
1
that they were ••gentlemen of great abilities,'* capable of dealing
successfully with large problems.
The delegates themselves expressed some fear on the score
st
of monarchy. George Mason, writing on June 1 , said, '*l/l^hen I
first came here, Judging from casual conversations with gentlemen
from different States, I was very apprehensive that soured and
disgusted with the unexpected evils we had experienced from the
democratic principles of our governments, we should be apt to run
into the opposite extreme ... of which I still think there is some
2
danger . . . '*
Randolph, on June 1®^, argued against unity in the execu-
tive in a manner which suggests he feared that a monarchy was de-
3
sired by some of the delegates. There may be an underlying signi-
ficance in 7/ilson's answer that '*The people of Amer. [America] did
not oppose the British King but the parliament ... not ... Unity
1
Robert Morris to his sons, June 25, 1787; Parrand,III,
p. 49.
2
George Mason to George Mason, Jr., June 1, 1787; Parrand;
III, p. 32.
3
M; Farrand,I, p. 66.
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1
but a corrupt multitude." To be sure, WilBon was standing for
2
three years and no exclusion or rotation, but he may have expected
that this would, in practice, amount to a tenure during good be-
havior. 3ome days later, Mason is reported as asking, '*Do gentle-
3
men mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy?" and hoping "^that
4
nothing like a monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country.'*
The "great diversity of sentiment" to which Hicholas Gilman referred
5
on July 31^^, included an advocacy of "high-toned Monarchy" on the
part of "vigorous minds and warm Constitutions."
Although the Hamilton plan had not even been debated, the
th
decisions of the Convention by iiugust 13 had been such as to stir
Randolph to exclaim that the Dresident had the form at least of
6
"a little monarch." It was this same day that Slbridge Gerry
wrote to General Warren that he sincerely hoped that the proceed-
ings of the Convention, when complete, would "not be engrafted
with principles of ... despotism," which, as he wrote, "some, you
7
and I know, would not dislike to find in our national constitution."
1
Z; Farrand, I, p. 71.
2
Ibid.
3
M. , June 4; Farrand,I, p. 101.
4
Ibid., p. 102.
5
Hicholas Gilman to Joseph Gilman, July 31, 1787; Farrand,
III, p. 66, ITote that Hamilton's plan had been introduced six
weeks before this statement, i.e., M. , etc.; June 18; Farrand,I,
p. 282 ff.
6
M.
,
Farrand,II, p. 278.
7
August 13; FarrandjIII, p. 69.
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It may be, as Farrand sugp;e8ts, that such hints were circulated to
1
try out popular sentiment on the subject.
th
Hamilton's plan, presented in Convention June 18 , is,
of course, at the bottom of these fears and expectations. Charges
that Hamilton proposed a monarchical government are censured by
Farrand as "based upon garbled reports of his speech, and ... made
for political purposes ... when Hamilton was the most formidable
2
opponent of the Democratic-Republican party.'* He further says,
"Hamilton had not proiDosed a monarchy'* but had merely "expressed
3
himself bravely ... for a strong centralized government.'* The
evidence seems to permit of an interpretation quite different from
this, namely, that Hamilton's plan contained strongly monarchical
elements, and that he had some reason to believe that it might
receive support.
Hamilton's defence of himself contains a suggestion that
he was fortifying his position against any future publication of
the Convention records. Thus in a reply to anonymous charges,
(in 1792), after asserting that they were of a character to denote
the '*personal enemy in the garb of the political opponent, he
remarks that the secrecy with which the deliberations of the Con-
1
Farrand, '^Framing of the Constitution,** p. 175. Kote
also the Hainilton-?/adsworth-Humphreys correspondence; Hamilton's
'•V/orks'* I, pp. 440-444.
2
Farrand, "Framing of the Constitution," p. 88.
3
Ibid.
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vention were carried on must be considered proper by "every prudent
man" for "propositions, made without due reflection, and perhapa
abandoned by the proposers themselves on more mature reflection,
1
would have been handles for a profusion of ill-natured accusation."
Again, his assurance that "the deliberations of the Convention ...
were to remain unmolested," may indicate that he had a personal in-
terest in preserving them from becoming the material for "inflamm-
2
atory declamation,"
He further denies that he "opposed the constitution in
the ..• convention, because it was too republican," offering as
proof the facts that he was the only raeraber from New York who signe d
it, and that he signed although it was "probably" against the will
of "a large majority of his fellow-citizens, till better information
should correct their first impressions," On his second point it
may be remarked that it convicts him, on his own confession, of
valuing his opinion as to what is good for the people above their
own opinions. It is possible that he might have carried. this
principle to still greater extremes, had he not been deterred by
the thought that in the attempt to gain more the whole might be
lost,
th
Aooording to Madison's notes, Hamilton, on June 26 ,
4
"acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Bepublican Qovern-
1
Extract from J, C. Hamilton, "Hist. of the U. S.;" Farrandj
III, p. 368,
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
The underscoring in these three cases is not in the
original manuscript.
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raent" and ''addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably
of it, in order to prevail on thera to tone their Government as high
1 th
as possible.'* King, in his notes for June 18 , cites Hamilton
as saying, "I fear Republioanisra will not answr. [answer] and yet
we cannot go beyond it— I think the British Govt, is the only
proper one for suoh an extensive Country— this Govt, unites the
2
highest public strength with the most perfect individual security."
Again, he said that he was '*as zealous an advocate for liberty as
any man whatever ... though he differed as to the form in which it
^ th
was most eligible. ** On June 18 , in introducing his plan, he is
quoted as saying that **it seemed to be admitted'* that no good exe-
cutive "could be established on Republican principles," asking if
this was not '^giving up the merits of the question," since it was
doubtful whether there could be '^a good Govt, without a fi;ood
Executive." He praised the "English Model" as the only good one
4
on this subject" and criticised the reoublican form as "liable to
5
foreign corruption and intrigue."
To return to Hamilton's defense of himself, he stated,
in 1792, that he "never made a proposition to the convention which
was not conformable to the republican theory , " and that "the highest
toned of any of the propositions made by him, was actually voted
1
M.
,
Farrand,!, p. 4E4.
2
K.
,
Ibid., p. 303.
3
M. , June 26; Ibid., p. 424.
4
M. , June 18; Ibid., p. 289.
5
H.
,
Ibid,, p. 310.
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for by the representatives of several states, including some of
the principal ones, and including individuals who, in the estima-
tion of those who deem themselves the only republicans, are pre-
1
eminent for republican character.** J. C. Hamilton apparently
attaches much significance to the fact that when his father made
this statement "nearly all the members of the convention were
8
living,'* and, presumably, able to refute it if untrue. Hamilton's
defense did not allay all suspicion, for an anonymous writer, in
August, 1793, referred to the accusation of numerous persons, es-
pecially of Mr. Baldv;in, (who had been a member of the Convention),
3
that Hamilton had moved for a "King, Lords & Commons." As late
as 1803, Timothy Pickering wrote to Hamilton that a "Jacobin"
leader had recently declared "That Genl. Hamilton proposed ... in
the General Convention, that the President of the United States,
and the Senators, should be chosen for life: that this was intended
4
as an introduction to Monarchy."
To attempt any judgment on monarchical tendencies in the
Convention it is necessary to know what Hamilton and his contem-
poraries understood by the terms "republic" and "monarchy." Ham-
ilton, in the "Syllabus of the Federalist,** emphasized the fact
that the word "republic" had been "used in various senses" and
'^applied to aristocracies and monarchies," referring to Rome, with
1
Extract from J. C. Hamilton, "Hist, of the U. S.;"
Farrand^III, pp. 36 8-369.
2
Ibid.
, p. 368.
3
August 30, 1793; Farrand^III, p. 369.
4
Pickering to Hamilton, April 5, 1803; Ibid., p. 397.
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its kings; ST)arta , with a senate for life; the United Netherlands,
with its stadtholder and hereditary nobles; Poland and Great
1
Britain v/ith aristocratic and monarchical institutions." His most
direct statement on the subject, perhaps, is the following; "As
long as offices are open to all men, and no constitutional rank is
2
established, it is pure republicanism."
Madison's famous definition of "republic" runs as follows:
"A government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that
it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an in-
considerable proportion, or a favored class of it ... It is suffi -
cient for such a government that the persons administering it be
apT)ointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that
they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just speci-
3
fied."
Hamilton favored a strong central government as the surest
protection against monarchy. He also admired the British monarchy
as the best form of government in the world. These two positions
are not inconsistent v;hen one considers the vagueness with which
"monarchy" was defined at that time. In the first instance, Hamil-
1
"The Federalist," p. xliii.
2
Y. , June 26; Farrand,!, p. 432.
3
"The Federalist," no. 39 [38], p. 246.
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ton was thinking of monarchy as "tyranny," Just as v/hen he said,
"If v/e incline too muoh to a democracy we shall soon shoot into a
1
monarchy.'* On the other hand, holding with Montesquieu "that a
ffovernment must be fitted to a nation as much as a coat to the
2
individual," he regarded forms of government as merely means to
an end. And he believed that the constitutional monarchy, in the
stability of its executive, possessed fundamental principles of
good government, principles which, properly adapted, would meet
the needs of the case in hand.
As to Hamilton's definition of monarchy, his sketchy
notes in the "Syllabus of the Federalist" refer to the use of the
3
term to describe a ruler who is independent of those governed.
More complete is his statement in the Convention: "Monarch is an
indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of
power. If this Executive Magistrate [the one he had proposed] wd.
be a monarch for life—the other propd. [proposed] by the Report
4
from the Committee of the whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years."
Probably many persons of Hamilton's day considered
"monarchy" and "tyranny" as almost interchangeable. Paterson, for
example, in expressing his opposition to a measure which would in-
jure the small states said he "had rather submit to a monarch, to
1
Y. , June 26; Farrand,I, p. 432.
2
Hamilton to Lafayette, Jan. 6, 1799; "Works'/ VI, p. 388.
Though later than the Convention period, this probably expresses
his political philosophy at the earlier time as well.
3
"The Federalist," p. xliv.
4
M. , June 18; Farrand, I, p. 290.
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1
a despot, than to auoh a fate," WilBon recognized and refuted
this class of objections when he said, "Where the Executive was
really formidable, King and Tyrant , were naturally associated in
the ininds of people," but "where the executive v.as not formidable"
2
the Legislature and Tyranny "were most properly associated."
Wilson apparently associated monarchy with aristocracy
when he argued that there was no danger of monarchy in the chance
that the executive magistrate should be taken from one of the large
states, since the people of the three large states were no more
3
aristocratic than those of the smaller ones. Randolph, however,
clearly considered the two as separate, since he compared the action
being taken on the Senate in September as doing for "aristocracy"
4
what had already been done for "monarchy.**
Although Randolph objected to the executive office, in
the form in which it stands in the Constitution, as in some respects
5
approaching monarchy, McClurg had asserted that he was "not so
much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to be unwilling to approach
it; nor so wedded to Republican Govt, as not to be sensible of the
tyrannies that had been & may be exercised under that form. Itwas an
essential object with him to make the Executive independent of the
1
M. , June 9; Farrand,!, p. 179.
2
M.
,
August 15; Farrand, II, pp. 300-301. Compare his
words on June 16, as reported by Madison; Farrand, I, p. 254.
3
M. , June 30; Farrand, I, p. 483.
4
M. , September 5; Farrand, II, p. 513.
5
M.
,
September 5; Farrand, II, p. ol3.
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1
Legislature'* and although the obstacle to suoh independenoe was
later removed by other means than hia, it is interesting to note
that he was willing to take a step rauoh nearer to monarchy than
these which Randolph later feared.
Independence on the part of the Executive was, in Mr.
a
Sherman's opinion, "the very essence of tyranny." although he did
not have in mind the monarchical form in its entirety, he probably
considered this independence as a monarchical tendency , and as such
to be avoided. On the other hand, Mr. Dickinson felt that since it
seemed inexpedient to secure executive independence through the
means afforded by the British form, other means, though inferior,
3
should be used for this purpose.
The preceding "definitions" of monarchy are gleaned from
scattered references and represent individual opinion. The follow-
ing considerations deal with conceptions held by considerable num-
bers of persons, namely, that unity and stability and all that per-
tained to them, were peculiar to the monarchical form of govern-
ment,
Randolph insisted that even with a Council, "A unity of
4
the Executive ,,. would savour too much of a monarchy." Mr.
Wilson refused to believe unity a step towards monarchy, insisting
1
M.
,
July 17; Parrand,II, p. 36.
2
M. , June 1; Parrand,I, p. 68.
3
M. , June £; ]!'arrand,I, pp. 86-87.
4
P., June 1; Farrand,I, p. 74.
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1
that it would rather be "the circumstance to prevent it.**
A later and more vigorous expression of a **nece8sary"
connection between executive unity and monarchical government is
th
found in Williamson's speech of July 24 . It runs in part thus:
"Another objection agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an
elective King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no
pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for
E
the succession of his children,"
The connection of extensive executive powers with monar-
chical tendencies was not a distinct issue to the framers of the
Constitution. This connection was, however, considered in an in-
direct way. Thus Mr. Mason admitted that a monarchy possessed
secrecy, disDatch, and energy, the advantages urged for a single
3
Executive "in a much greater degree than a republic." In this
same speech, Iifeson opposed a complete veto for the Executive on the
grounds that it would tend to constitute a monarchy more dangerous
4
than the British Government— "an elective one." Another opponent
of the absolute veto was Mr. Butler, who said he would v/ithdraw
5
his support of unity in the Executive if it was adopted.
Mr. Rutledge "was by no means disposed to grant so great
a power" as the appointment of judges "to any single person" for,
1
?. , June 1; Farrand,I, p. 74.
2
M; ParrandjII, p. 101.
3
Ma., June 4; Farrand, I, p. 112.
4
M.
,
Ibid., p. 106.
5
Ibid.
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he suid, ''The people will tliink we aro leaning too muoh tov.ards
1
Monarch^'. " Gerry opposed the appointment of the aenate by the
national executive as "a stride towards monarchy that few will think
2
of!"
A possible danger from "war powers" of the executive did
not escape the attention of some in the Convention. Powers of
peace and war in the executive would render that magistrate "a
3
Monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one," according to
Mr, Charles Pinckney. Randolph, in advocating impeachments, said
"The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power;
4
particularly in time of war."
Many, in fact most, of the members of the Convention re-
garded long and certain tenure so fundamental a characteristic of
monarchy that they refused to adopt a long term because they con-
5
sidered it opposed to republican principles. Thus Mason "con-
sidered an Executive during good behavior as a softer name only for
an Executive for life," and warned the assembly that "the next
6
would be an easy step to hereditary Monarchy." Life tenure with
7
the "princely status" that would almost certainly have accompanied
1
M. , June 5; Parrand,!, p. 119.
E
M. , June 7; ffarrand, I, p. 152.
5
M. , June 1; Parrand, I, pp. 64-65.
4
E.
,
July 20; Parrand,II, p. 67.
5
M.
,
July 17; Parrand,II, p. 35.
6
Ibid.
7
Krauel in the "Am. Hist. Rev.," Oct., 1911, p. 50.
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it, may "be safely termed a monarchical tendency, and thue the
support of 8uoh a feature by prominent delegates is full of sug-
gestions to a student of the period.
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CHAPTER V
Hamilton's Plan; Its Purpose and Supporters.
"A gentleman from New York thinks a limited monarchy the
"best government," said Sherman,-^ referring to Alexander Hamilton,
The evidence seems to show, however, that the plan which this
gentleman actually proposed to the Convention*^ was meant to be a
careful combination of the best features of monarchy and democracy
on a republican basis. Great as was his admiration for the British
monarchy, Hamilton did not wish to transfer it, entire, to
American soil, since he believed that "what may be good at Phila-
4
delphia, may be bad at Paris, and ridiculous at Petersburgh.
"
His real desire, it may be contended, was to combine the separatioa
of powers and the stability of the British form with the represen-
tative feature of a republic and a popular participation consistent
with democracy, and thus to meet the peculiar needs of America*
The resulting form in operation would probably have been a sort of
elective monarchy or stadtholdership.
If, as Burgess states, "a democratic state may, without
violence to its own principle, construct for itself a government in
5
which the executive power will hold by hereditary right," it
would not be impossible to combine Hamilton's proposed executive
1
Y,, June 28; Farrand, I, p. 457.
2
For Hamilton's Plan see Farrand, I, pp. 282 ff,;
Hamilton's "Works," II, pp. 395, 409.
3
M, , June 18; Ibid., p. 288,
4
Letter to Lafayette, Jan. 6, 1799; Hamilton's "Works,"
VI, p, 388.
5
Burgess, "Political Science," II, p. 308,
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wlth the safeguards of demooraoy. Hamilton himself said that "an
exeoutlve is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in
office during life, than for seven years. He believed one branoh
of the government could be especially devoted to the representa-
tlon of the "poorer orders of citizens." His own plan, accordingly,
provided for an assembly elected by the people, "on a broad founda-
3
tlon." He did not propose, however, that the only check on the
democratic assembly was to be in a democratic senate and a demo-
4
oratic chief magistrate. Thus he proposed that "one body of the
legislature be constituted during good behavior or life and that
the Executive have a similar tenure.^ "Real liberty," he said, "is
neither found in despotism or the extremes of demooraoy, but in
moderate governments." He accordingly combined with a democratic
assembly features of government respectively republican and monarch-
ical*
While the vast extent of the country "almost led him to
despair" of the establishment of a republican government, he "was
sensible. ••••• .that it would be unwise to propose one of any other
7form." The essential of a republic which he had in mind was the
1
Y., June 18; Farrand,I, p* 300.
2
M«, June £6; Ibid., p. 424.
3
M., Sept. 8; Parrand,!!, pp. 553-564.
4
M», June 18; Parrand,!, p. 300.
5
Ibid.
6
y. , June 26; Parrand,!, p. 432.
7
M. , June 18; Parrand,!, p. 288.
iI
I
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representatlve feature, according to which office holders are
drawn from the people, are elected by the people, and act according
to the will of the people. In supporting the Constitution In "The
Federalist" Hamilton points out that the Imperfections of republics
have been lessened by certain modem "discoveries" such as "the
Institution of courts composed of Judges holding their offices
during good behavior."^ It may be fairly suggested that, had he
dared, he would have still further diminished these "Imperfections"
by measures which savoured still more strongly of monarchy.
And finally, Hamilton said, "Those who mean to form a
solid republican government, ought to proceed to the confines of
g
another government," namely, monarchy. He would "go to the full
length of republican principles" In order to approach as near as
possible to "the excellency of the British executive - He is placed
above temptation - He can have no distinct interests from the pub-
lic welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient.
The weak side of a republican government is the danger of foreign
influence. This is unavoidable, unless it is so constructed as to
bring forward its first characters in its support."* In accordance
with these convictions Hamilton proposed an executive, subject to
impeachment, elected by a double set of electors, to hold office
1
"The Federalist," pp. 48-49. Compare Dickinson's state-
ment; M. , June 2; Farrand,I, p. 87.
2
Y. , June 26; Farrand,!, p. 432.
3
y. , June 18; Farrand,I, p. 300.
4
Ibid., pp. 299-300.
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durlng good behavior, to have an absolute veto, and to apjoint the
governors of the states - who, in turn, should have an absolute
veto over the State legislatures,^ This, quite correctly, savoured
of "elective monarchy" to many, and "elective monarchy" to these
? 3
men meant the worst and most dangerous type of monarchy.
Hamilton doubtless felt that the concrete examples such as Poland
and Holland, which the delegates had in mind, did not fairly demon-
4
strate the possibilities of the form of government.
Culoertson, in his "Essay on Hamilton," emphasizes the
point that Hamilton's controlling ideal was nationalism, the belief
"that deeper than man*s selfish interest, deeper even than his
loyalty to his class, is his loyalty to his nation which
leads individuals and classes by wise statesmanship, to co-
operate within the nation in order to make their group powerful
5
against other groups. Might not this ideal have stirred Hamilton
to propose not only earnestly, but hopefully, a plan which, by its
strong centralization of power, and its stable executive, seemed to
hold greater possibilities than did others, for developing a
strong and independent nation?^
1
M. , June 18; Farrand, I, pp. 29E-293.
2
Charles Finckney; M. , June 1; Parr and, I, p. 65.
3
Mason; M. , June 4; Farrand, I, p. 101.
4
M. , June 18; Farrand, I, pp. 290-291.
5
Culbertson, "Alexander Hamilton," p. 8.
6
An important reason why Hamilton believed a more demo-
cratic plan inadequate is found in his experiences in the ill paid
Revolutionary Army and in the Congress of the Confederation. (See
Lodge, "Alexander Hamilton," pp. 42-43).
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That Hamilton considered his plan aerloaaly, and not as a
mere balance to the New Jersey plan,-^ is shown by the following
considerations. First, although "no man's ideas were more remote
from the plan than his own were known to be," he loyally supported
2the Constitution for what "chance of good" there was in it, and
3yet he never ceased to feel that something stronger was necessary.
His development of the doctrine of "implied powers" bears testimony
to the truth of this contention.^
Again, Hamilton believed that there was reason to hope
for popular support for his plan. On June 18th he said, "I confess
that this plan [is] very remote from the idea of the people. Per-
haps the New Jersey plan is nearest their expectation. But the
people are gradually ripening in their opinions of government-
5
they begin to be tired of an excess of democracy."
1
See Lodge, "Alexander Hamilton," pp. 62-63, for the
contrary view.
2
M.
,
Sept. 17; Parrand, II, pp. 645-646.
3
Hamilton's part in "The Federalist," and his tireless
efforts for ratification in New York should be remembered in this
connection. Lodge suggests that the acceptance of Burr's challenge
was due to Hamilton's desire to avoid a taint of cowardice which
would disqualify him as leader of a party against the anarchy he be-
lieved inevitable under the Constitution. (Lodge, "Alexander
Hamilton," pp. 270-E71.)
4
See Culbertson, "Alexander Hamilton," p. 57.
5
Y., June 18; Farrand, I, p. 301.
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In Juno Hamilton believed that "a great progrees" had
"heen already made" and was "still f^olng on In the publlo mind,"
This led hlra to believe that In time the people would be "unshackled
from their prejudices," and "be ready to go as far at least'as he
proposed."^ A fortnight later, In his passage through the Jerseys,
he believed he saw evidence that an "astonishing revolution for
the better" had already taken place In the minds of the people, and
that they had came to desire "something not very remote from that
which they had lately quitted." He writes, "These appearances,
though they will not warrant a conclusion that the people are yet
ripe for such a plan as I advocate, yet serve to prove that there
la no reason to despair of their adopting one equally energetic. If
the Convention should think proper to propose It.
One reason for Hamilton's hope of support within the
3
Convention is expressed in the following words, in Madison's record
of Hamilton's speech on June 18th, "He hoped Gentlemen of dif-
ferent opinions would hear with him and .recollect the
change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was
1
M. , June 18; Farrand,!, p. 296.
8
Letter to Washington, July 3, 1787; Hamilton' s"Works ."
(ed. by J. C. Hamilton), I, pp. 435-436. See also his correspondence
with Wadsworth and Humphreys; "Works", I, pp. 440-444. His "reasons
of some moment " for seeking information on the elusive letter in
question may well have concerned his desire to know the popular
reaction to monarchical ideas.
3
For MoHenry's assertion that Mercer made a list of about
twenty names of those favoring a monarchy, see Farrand, II, pp, 191-
192. Mercer later attempted to deny this, with no certain success.
See Farrand, III, pp. 320-321.

still going on. It was onoe thought that the power of Conga
[Congresa] was amply sufficient to aeoure the end of their Insti-
tution. The error was now seen by every one This progress
• • led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as
himself would join" in the assertion that the British Government
was the only one In the world whloh united "public strength with
Individual security."^
It Is obvious that Hamilton could not count on the sup-
port of all those who like himself, dreaded too much democracy,
for many of them were States-rights men and thus opposed to his
nationalistic Ideas. There were others, however, who were willing
to support Important features of his plan. Men like Read,
Dickinson, Gorham, Wilson, King, and Washington may have been de-
terred from full sympathy with Hamilton's plan by the one fear of
risking "what was then deemed the last chance for a respectable
2
union, on a scheme which would be hopeless of acceptance."
Read, of Delaware, although from a small state, favored
4
a strong national government, appointment of the Senate by the
5 A
chief Executive, the appointment of the treasurer by the Executive,"
1
Farrand,I, p. 288.
S
Lodge, "Alexander Hamilton," p. 62.
3
Ibid.
4
Farrand, I, pp. 136, 202, 463.
5
Ibid,, p. 151.
6
Farrand, II, p. 314.
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an absolute negative for the Exeoutlve.^ and a good behavior tenure
for the Senate. His delegation voted for a good behavior tenure
for the Executive,^
From Pierce's description of Read It is obvious that he
oould not have made muoh impression on the Convention, "His powers
of Oratory are fatiguing to the last degree;- his voice is
feeble, and his articulation so bad that few can have patience to
4
attend to him."
As Beard says, "John Dickinson. .frankly Joined that
minority which was outspoken in its belief In a monarchy-an action
that comported with his refusal to sign the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and his reluctance to embark upon the stormy sea of
Revolution."^ On June 2nd he remarked, "that a firm Executive
could only exist in a limited Monarchy A limited Monarchy
he considered as one of the best Governments in the world.
It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from
any of the republican form." But a limited monarchy was out of the
question, because of "the spirit of the times" and the "state of
our affairs" and because it was impossible to create "by a stroke
of the pen" a House of Nobles, v/hioh he considered essential to
1
Farrand,II, p. 200.
2
Farrand, I, pp. 409-421.
3
July 17; Parrand,II, p. 36.
4
Farrand,III, p. 93.
5
Beard "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution "
p. 194.
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thl8 form of government. He therefore looked to remedying the
republican form In suoh a way as to make It more perfect than It
had proved In the republics of the ancient world, He doubtless
voted for a good behavior tenure for the Executive as a means to
this end.^
Sorham's attitude to monarchy at the time of the Conven-
tion Is especially interesting In view of his supposed connection
with the Henry of Prussia affair. His only reference to monarchy
reported In the Records was made In supporting the proposed guaran-
tee by the United States of a republican constitution to each State,
It would be strange that "the Genl, Govt, should be restrained
from Interposing" to subdue any rebellion that might take place in
a State, for, "At this rate an enterprising citizen might erect the
standard of Monarchy in a particular State, might gather together
partizans from all quarters, might extend his views from State to
State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole," His
manner of speaking would indicate that he considered an attempt at
monarchy as not impossible.
The fact that Gorham did not oppose the exclusion of
foreigners from becoming eligible for the position of chief magis-
1
M;. Farrand,!, pp. 86-87,
2
Mj Farrand,II, p. 36,
3
See above, Chap. II.
4
M,
,
July 18; Farrand,II, p. 48,
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trata shows that (Jorham had given up the Prussian scheme. If,
Indeed, he had ever entertained It, Very likely he believed that
the Convention opened the way to a more moderate and therefore more
generally aooeptable solution of the problem whloh so conoerned
him.
"Mr, Gouverner Morris was as little a friend to monarchy
as any gentleman. He concurred that the way to keep out
monarchical Oovt. was to establish such a Repub. 3ovt. as would make
1
It was decided In Convention that "no person except a
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
office of President. (J., Sept. 4; Farrand,!!, p. 494.) John Jay,
in a letter to Washington, (Farrand, III, p, 61) apparently had small
grounds for his fear that the Convention might not provide "a
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration
of the national government," for though there was much diversity
of opinion on the subject, no one proposed admitting foreigners
to full political privileges without a long "apprenticeship," and
the eligibility of even a naturalized foreigner to the position
of President was apparently considered too Impossible to require
discussion. The following references in Farrand bear upon the at-
titude of members of the Convention to foreigners.
Bedford; I, pp. 501, 531.
Butler; II,j,.269.
Franklin; II, p. 236.
Gerry; I, p. 532; II, pp, 268, 285.
Hamilton; I, pp. 466, 473; II, p. 268.
Madison; II, pp. 235-236; 268-269.
Mason; II, p. 271.
Morris; I, p. 530; II, pp. 237, 238, 243, 270.
Wilson; II, pp. 237, 269.
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the people happy and prevent a desire of ohange." "Flokle and
2
Inconstant," It Is difficult to dlsoover what means ho really con-
sidered best to attain this end. On July 6th he said. "We should
either take the British Constitution altogether or make one for
ourselves." On July 7th "he was ready to Join In devlsinc such an
amendment as Lwould] he most likely to secure liberty fib
4happiness." On July 17th he seconded McClurg's motion for a good
behavior tenure, expressed "great pleasure" at hearing "so valuable
an ingredient," and was even "indifferent how the Executive should
be chosen, provided, he held his place by this tenure."^ This was
when the appointment of the Executive was to be by the Legislature.
Two days later he was advocating election by the people and a two
year term. In Morris' defense it should be said that the good
7behavior tenure had in the meantime been voted down, and, moreover,
that Morris believed a two year term would in fact be indefinitely
extended so long as the magistrate "should behave himself well."
Earlier in the Convention, July 2nd, Morris had approved
1
M«, July 17th; Parrand,!!, pp. 35-36. Perhaps in regard
to monarchy as well as aristocracy, Morris prided himself on op-
posing "the thing, not the name." (See ?arrand,II, p. 202.)
2
Pierce's "Character Sketches;" Farrand,III, p. 92.
3
M.
,
Farrand,I, p. 546.
4
Ibid., p. 563.
5
M.
,
July 17; Farrand,!!, p. 33.
6
M.
,
July 19; Farrand, II, p. 54. The direct cause of this
stand was the desire to avoid impeachments. The question of im-
peachments In this connection deserves further study,
7
M.
,
July 17; Farrand, II, p. 36.
8
M.
,
July 19; Farrand, II, p. 54.
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rn life tenure for the Senate and an appointment of senators by the
executive. Moreover, on July 6th he expressed the hope that while
they could not annihilate they might perhaps "take out the teeth
2
of the serpents," I.e., "State attachments," the baneful agents of
decentralization. On the whole. It would seem that Hamilton, though
3
unable to predict Morris' stand, might have hoped for his support.
4King was one of the three delegates who, on June 4th,
voted for a complete negative for the Executive.^ On June 1st he
upheld a seven year term and later, July 19th, when this term was
negatived, he expressed anxiety lest too short a duration be adopted.
On July 80th he Is reported as saying that the Executive "ought not
to be Impeachable unless he hold his office during good behavior, a
tenure which would be most agreeable to him; provided an Independent
Q
and effectual forum be devised" for .Impeachment. On the other
hand, his suggestion on July 24th, that the Executive term be twenty
1
M. , Farrand I, pp. 512-513. He believed that a stable
Senate was needed to check the "precipitancy, changeability , and
excess " of democracy. (Y., July 2nd; Farrand, I, p. 517,
2
M,
,
Farrand,!, p, 530,
3
On his return from the Convention, Morris spoke unre-
servedly of Implied powers as the means of making the Constitution
successful In operation. Shea, "Life of Hamilton," p. VII.
4
See Chapter II for King's part in the Henry of Prussia
affair,
5
K. , June 4; Farrand,!, p. 108,
6
K4 Farrand,!, p. 72,
7
M> Farrand,!!, p. 59.
8
M5 Ibid.
, p. 67.
Ii
1
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years, slnoe "This Is the medium life of prlnoes," is noted by
Madison as "possibly meant as a oarloature" of the Immediately
preceding motions for terms of eleven and fifteen years.
^
One thing is sure, Hamilton felt that King understood his
point of view for during his absence from the Convention In the
latter part of August, it was King whom he asked to keep him Informed
2
of any new developments which might arise.
The "complete negative" proposition, seconded by Hamilton
and supported by King, had been moved by Wilson* In other respects
he is rather a supporter of the general principle of centralized
government than of Hamilton's particular form of It. Although he
4
was "for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude »"
he favored a short executive term and reeligiblllty.
^
The proposal for a good behavior term for the Executive
6
was made on July 17th, by James McClurg of Virginia. "It was an
essential object with him to make the Executive independent of the
Legislature, and the only mode left for effecting It, after the vote
destroying his ineligibility a second time, was to appoint him dur-
1
M.; Farrand,II, p. 102.
2
Hamilton to King, Aug. 20th, 1787; Farrand,III, p. 70.
Uote that King was later a leader of the Nationalistic party. Hew
Int. Enc, XIII, p. 241.
3
K. , June 4th; Farrand,!, p. 107.
4
M.
,
May 31st; Farrand,!, p. 49.
5
M,; Farrand, I, p. 68. There seems no indication, as with
Morris, that Wilson may have thought a short tenure with reellgi-
billty equivalent to tenure during good behavior.
6
M; Farrand, II, p. 33,
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Ing good behavior," It Is Improbable that MoClurg'a support of
this part of Hamilton's plan could have counted for muoh aH he was
not an effective speaker, A similar oase was that of Mr. Broom, ''a
3plain good man, with .nothing to render him conspicuous,"
4
who "highly approved" of the good behavior motion.
In view of Hamilton's well founded olalm that "The father
of the Constitution" voted for the "highest toned" feature he had
proposed,^ Madison's position is Important, In addition to voting
for a good behavior tenure for the executive, Madison supported it,
though with considerable caution, in the course of the debates.
Thus on July 17th, Madison said that the propriety of McClurg's
motion depended on the "praotioabillty of instituting a tribunal for
7
Impeachments." He was careful to insist, both In his speech and
in his notes for the day, that his support of the motion was due to
Q
his "particular regard" for the mover. Furthermore, In his foot-
note on the vote on the question he says, "This vote is not to be
considered as any certain index of opinion, as a number In the af-
firmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached
1
M; Parrand,II, p, 36.
2
Pierce's "Character Sketches;" Parrand,III, p. 95.
3
Ibid. p. 93.
4
M; Farrand,II, p. 33.
6
Statements of Hamilton, 1793; Farrand^III, pp. 368-369;
and 1803; Ibid., p. 398.
6
M; Farrand,II, p. 36.
7
Ibid., pp. 34,35.
8
Ibid., pp. 34,35.
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to a dependeno© of the Executive on the Legislature, Sc thereby
faoilltate some final arrangement of a contrary tendency.""^
Madison's oautlon Is explained best by his ovm words In
"The Federalist;'* "It is evident that no other form than a Republic
would be reconcilable with the genius of .... America; with the
fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable
determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all
our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-gov-
ernment. If the plan of the Convention, therefore, be found to
depart from the republican character. Its advocates must abandon it
3
as no longer defensible."
Madison did not consider the Constitution as agreed upon
ideal. In October of the year following the Convention he explained
1
Mj Farrand, II, p. 36. The vote was 6 states to 4 in
the negative.
2
Note that a short while before the Convention Madison
had "scarcely ventured •••• to form his own opinion, either of the
manner In which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities
with which It ought to be clothed." (North American Review, Oct.
1827, p. 266). On June 1st he said that if the powers of the ex-
ecutive should be lar^re they would "have the Evils of elective
Monarchies" and that probably the best plan was "a single Executive
of long duration with a Council, with liberty to depart from their
Opinion at his peril." (K; Farrand I, p. 70). On July 17th he
"was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step towards
monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its introduction
.......The preservation of Republican Govt .required some
expedient" for restraining the instability & encroachments" of the
legislature, and "In devising It, the genuine principles of that
form should be kept in view." Farrand II, p. 35.
3
"The Federalist," No. 39 38 p. 245.
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that he had signed the Constitution because he "thought It the
best that oould be obtained from the Jarring Interests of States,
1
and the mlsoellaneous opinions of Politicians."
Finally, the question may arise as to whether Hamilton
expected support from Washington. The two had been in correspond-
ence ever since the close of the War, on the need of a strong cen-
2
tral government. Although Hamilton probably knew of the outcome
of the Nicola affair, he may have had reason to believe that
Washington had been gradually tending to stronger measures. At
any rate, his expectation that, although he had not compared his
Ideas with Washington, the latter would receive them with courteous
4
consideration, was not disappointed. The answer to Hamilton's
letter of July 3rd, reveals sympathy and understanding on the part
of Washington, who thanked the former for his letter, and wished
that he were back in the convention, since the situation was "im-
portant and alarming." He almost despaired "of seeing a favorable
issue to the proceedings of the convention." felt contempt for
"narrow-minded" men who opposed a "strong and energetic govern-
ment',' and believed that their contention that the people would not
accede to the form proposed was only an excuse for their opposition
\ladison to Philip Mazzei , Oct. B, 1788; Farrand,III,
p. 353.
2
See Washington's "Writings," X-XI.
3
See above. Chap. I, p. 14, r>n Washington's change of
attitude from August 1786 to March 1787.
4
Hamilton to Washington. July 3, 1787; "Works", I,
p. 436.
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Most Important of all la his etateraent that "admitting that the
present sentiment la as they prognosticate, the question ought
nevertheless to be. Is It or Is It not the best form that suoh a
country as this oan adopt?"^
It Is certain that with Washington's aristocratic In-
stincts, and with his adherence to formalities, as evidenced In hie
administration as president, Washington could have played to per-
fection the role of elective monarch, had his theoretical scruples
5
been overcome, and the opportunity been presented.
The evidence goes to show that although the Convention
did not consider Inviting an English prince to become king,
monarchical Ideas were actually entertained. In varying degrees, by
several delegates and most especially by Hamilton.
\ashlngton to Hamilton, July 10, 1787; Hamilton's
"Works", I, p. 437.
2
It Is said that the '"Itle Washington preferred as presi-
dent was "His High Mightiness, the President of the United States
and Protector of Their Liberties." Farrand, "Framing of the Con-
stitution," p. 163.
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CmiPTER VI
The Influonoe of Foreign Examples;
Poland, Holland, Great Britain.
The classicists in the Convention "pointed out all the
beauties and defects of ancient Republics" and "compared their
situation with ours wherever it appeared to bear any anology [anal
1
ogy] . " These men, as well as others, were not blind to the im-
portance of more modern constitutions as guides in their work.
Poland, Holland, and Great Britain were discussed at considerable
length, but chiefly as horrible examples, save in the case of
Great Britain. The general principle was asserted that the people
of this country were "very different from the inhabitants of any
2
state" they were "acquainted with in the modern world." "Our
true situation," said Charles Pinckney, "appears to me to be this,
3
a new extensive Country containing within itself the materials
for forming a Government capable of extending to its citizens all
the blessings of civil & religious liberty ... I believe this ob-
1 th
See for example Madison's statements on June 4 , P;
Farrand, I, p. 110, and Hamilton's words on June 18'"'^, Y; Ibid.,
p. 296.
2
C. Pinckney, M. , June 25; Farrand,I, p. 401.
3
Hamilton, with his idea that the form of government is
like a coat which should be fitted to the individual might have
continued that to use one's material to best advantage one might
need to copy the cut of other coats. (See above, p.5l,not^£).
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servation will be found generully true: that no two people are so
exactly alike in their situation ... as to admit the exercise of
1
the same Goverment with equal benefit."
The First Partition of Poland (1772) had neft a body
politic that still contained the elements essential to continued
national life; in some respects it was even a salutary operation,"
While retaining certain distinctive features, such as the "liberum
veto" and the elective monarchy, the partitioning powers, (Russia,
Prussia, and Austria), "presented the Poles v/ith a constitution
superior to anything they had ever been able to devise for them-
3
selves." The aim of the three powers, and especially of Russia,
4
was to make Poland a serviceable dependent. Religious intolerance,
class distinctions, and serfdom persisted, and the Polish constitu-
5
tion was still somewhat anarchical, but sufficient stability,
order, and economy were introduced to permit some progress to be
6
made in financial, educational, and military reform.
The new constitution introduced a "Permanent Council"
thirty-six members, elected by the Diet every second year. This
Council was a supreme administrative board, and though unpopular
as a Russian invention, it "gave Poland an executive that could
C. Pinckney, M. , June 25; Farrand,!, p. 402.
2
Lord, "Second Partition of Poland," p. 484.
Enc, Brit., m, p. 919. (See E col.). •
4
Lord, "Second Partition," pp. 57-58.
5
Enc. Brit., XXI, p. 919.
6
Lord, "Second Partition," pp. 58-59.
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dominate the hitherto independent and lawless great officers of
the Crown" and 'gave the administration for the first lime some-
1
thing of unity and vigor. *• But the "szlachta, the military land-
owning class/* continued to dominate the government without suf-
ficient organization among themselves to make the government effec-
2
tive.
The interest of the Federal Convention in Poland centred
in the elective monarchy. This peculiar arrangement had been in-
troduced into Poland at the beginning of the period of Polish his-
3
tory extending from 157S to 1795. From 1572-73 onward, "it was
understood that the 'szlachta ' was quite free to choose v^hom they
would, and that the prince whom they chose was only their delegate,
entrusted by them with a rigidily limited portion of authority,
which might be revoked in case he overstepped his mandate. The
» szlachta' had thus anointed themselves with the majesty that had
once pertained to the Crown, and henceforth it became their chief^
concern to see that the sovereignty did not slip away from them."
The constitution given Poland after the first partition
still further limited the royal prerogatives. The king was pres-
ident of the permanent council, but could not summon the diet ex-
cept with its consent, and in appointments was limited to choosing
\ord, Oo. Cit., p. 58. The Council was also to advise
the King on all important matters.
2
Ibid., p. 8.
3
Francis, "The Grand Duchy of V/arsaw," pp. E, 3.
4
Lord, Op. Cit., p. 10.
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frora the council's nominees. It is significant that the Polish
constitution, even as reformed, wbs still so anarchicul that it
prevented Poland from taking proper advantage of the derangement
of the balance of power in Europe due to the death of Jj'rederlck
the Great in August, 1786. A later bit of evidence that the
elective feature of the monarchy was generally considered the
chief source of weakness in the Polish constitution is the fact
that when the Empress of Russia heard of the establishment of the
short-lived hereditary monarchy of 1791, she was "full of conster-
nation at the idea that Poland under an hereditary dynasty might
once more become a considerable power."
Hamilton practically admitted that his plan involved
an elective monarch, when he suggested that the evils of elective
monarchies "had been taken rather from particular cases [as Poland
and the German Empire] than from general principles»" and asked,
"might [not] auch a mode of election be devised among ourselves
as Will defend the community agst. these effects in any dangerous
3
degree?" Wilson and Morris both denied that, the tumults and in-
trigues of polish elections could ever be duplicated in the United
States, since they depended upon the fact that election in Poland
was in the hands of the nobles who could back their conflicting
1
Enc. Brit., IXI, ?. 919.
2
Madison remarked in Convention that the "elective Magis-
trate" of Poland had "very little real power." M. , July 85;
Parrand, II, p. 110»
3
M. . June 18; Parrand^I, pp. 290-291.
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1
ambitions with their resources and dependents. However, Hamil-
ton's argument that the principle of the elective monarchy of such
a country as Poland might be embodied in our constitution, without
the evil features of Intrigue and disorder, was not developed by
delegates who were more or less familiar with the history of that
2
unhappy country.
Krauel has said that Hamilton's proposal to make the
first officer of the republic hold his position for life would
have made the presidency **except for the exclusion of the heredi-
tary principle, approximate to the office of stadtholder as main-
3
tained in the Republic of the United Me therlands. ** There were,
indeed, sufficient points of likeness in the situations of the
United Provinces and the United States to suggest that the consti-
tution of the former might have been of service as an example to
the latter. Holland and her sister provinces had been confronted
July 17; Farrand, II, pp. 30 and 31 respectively. See
Lord, 'Second Partition of Poland," p. 29, for a description of
the "clients'* in Poland.
2 "th
Madison, for instance, in a speech of July 25 , re-
ferred to the fact that the election of the Polish king had "slid
entirely into foreign hands. '» (M; Farrand, II, pp. 109-llQ/.
Every nobleman "however indigent or insignificant he might be,
had the right to ... participate in the elections to the throne,"
(See Lord, Op. Git., p. 23). This situation together with the
jealousy among the nobles opened the way to foreign influence.
Paterson, in his notes for June 28'tli, emphasizes the division of
Poland as an example of oppression of small powers in Europe by
the great. Farrand, I, p. 459.
3
Krauel, "Prince Henry of Prussia;" Am. Hist. Rev.,
Oct. 1911, p. 50.
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with our problem of forming a "Union of Sovereign otatea pret;erv-
ing their Civil Liberties and oonneoted ... by auoh Tyea as to
1
Preserve permanent & effective Governments." The Provinces had
E
been rescued from foreign oppression by a great and noble leader,
3
who, like Washington, had been reluctant to accept supreme civil
4
power in addition to his military command.
The existence of the Dutch Republic may be said to date
from the Union of Utrecht, in 1581. The final separation of the
northern provinces from those of the south, which remained obedient
5
to Spain, was the work of William the Silent.
William had finally accepted the "entire authority as
sovereign and chief of the land" only "as long as the war should
continue" the addition of the time limitation being the only condi-
tion upon which he would accept "full power to command all forces
by land and sea, to appoint all military officers, and to conduct
all warlike operations, without the control ... of any person
whatsoever.** He was further authorized, "with consent of the
states, to appoint all financial and judicial officers,;" he was
Expression used by the N. C. delegates in letter to
Gov. Caswell, June 14, 1787; Farrand,III, p. 46.
2
See Motley, "The Dutch Republic," III, pp. 367-518.
3
William I has been called "the Washington of the six-
teenth century." See Motley, Op. Cit., I, p. vi.
4
Motley, Op. Cit., Ill, p. 507.
5
Motley, Op. Cit., I, p. vi.
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1
also "supreme executive chief, and fountain of justice and pardon!*
These powers included none which he had not already exercised for
five years as stadtholder for Philip of Spain. The difference lay
in the fact that he was no longer a viceroy but a sovereign. More-
over, as the time limitation was removed without his knowledge, he
E
was a sovereign for life,
WTiile William, according to the arrangement of March,
1581, was to rule as sovereign, it was **in conjunction with the
council of Holland and under conditions of the maintenance of
national and municipal privileges, while the Estates, composed of
the representatives of the nobles and fourteen cities, were recog-
nized in a mass of important points." The small cities, too, were
to be convened in cases of contribution, peace, war, or change of
government. In case of failure to agree in the last three matters
"the decision rested with the sovereign and some members of his
council or that of the province." The ruler was to be assisted
by three colleges of deputed councillors "one for general govern-
raent, one for finance, one for marine affairs."
A very important part of the Dutch Constitution was
the theory that "the origin of sovereignty was not vested in the
"""He accepted this offer of the "knights, nobles, and
cities of Holland and Zealand" on July 5, 1581. (See Motley,
"The Rise of the Dutch Republic", III, pp. 506-507J.
2
Ibid., p. 507,
3
Blok, "Hist, of the People of the Netherlands", III,
pp. 156-157.
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lord of the land, but in the Estates as representing the subjeots.
1
They could bestow the 'high sovereignty' on whom they wished.'*
In 1631 the hereditary principle had been introduced by the action
of the cJtatea in securing to Frederick Henry's infant son (later
William II), the reversion of the offices of stadtholder, captain,
8
and admiral-general. This arrangement was carried out but when
William II died, the office of stadtholder was suspended for twenty-
one years, till William III finally proved more acceptable to the
republic than was the grand pensionary, (first minister of the
3
state), who had virtually become president in the interval. William
III was made hereditary stadtholder in five of the Provinces in
167E but when he died, without a direct heir, the grand pensionary
once more led the Estates in an aSwjertion of independence of the
4
stadtholdership. Thus the theory that the sovereignty might be
5
vested in the Estates themselves was actually put into practice.
The hereditary principle was once more introduced soon after William
IV was proclaimed stadtholder, captain, and admiral-general in 1747^
1
Blok, "Hist, of the People of the He therlands'^ III, p. 159.
2
Blok, Op. Cit.,IV, pp. 60-61, also pp. 20-21.
3
Blok, Op. Cit.^IV, pp. 177-387, especially pp. 177, 347-
348, 385-387. The period extends from 1651 to 1673.
4
Enc. Brit.,ZIII, pp. 602-603. William III died in 1702
and William lY was not made stadtholder till 1747.
5
Blok, Op. Git., Ill, p. 159.
6
Enc. Brit.. XIII, p. 603.
r
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and William V, who was stadtholder in 17B7, held by virtue of
this hereditary right.
Although the stadtholder had considerable power, and
1
"represented the dignity of the state," he was indeed an unusual
ruler who oould check the encroachments of the Estates and suocess-
2
fully combat particularism. "The hydra-headed government of the
3 4
States-General had originated in encroachments upon the council.
The result was the "most unwieldy executive imaginable." "It was
only the dominance of a single province --Holland- -and the person-
ality of one States* official, v/hether he were stadtholder of one
or more provinces, as the prince of Orange had been, or whether
his personal influence were Dowerful, like Oldenbarnevelt • s, which
5
could secure the necessary force to wield the central government."
Blok characterizes the government in the northern
provinces as "aristocratic tempered by the stadtholder ' s authority,
allied to the municipal, territorial, and procincial privileges of
ancient origin conferred by the overlords." Although these privi-
Enc. Brit.,9''" ed. , XII, p. 80.
2
William I's authority had been sufficient to overshadow
that of the States. He had been '^governor in behalf of the States-
General, ruward of Brabant, stadtholder of Utrecht, ]?riesland, and
perhaps Flanders, sovereign chief of Holland and Zealand, and in-
fluential in Gelderland, Overyssel, and the Ommelands." (Blok,
"Hist, of the People of the Netherlands", III, pp. 159-160).
3
Blok, Op. Git., Ill, p. 238.
4
For council see above, p.
5
Blok, Op. Git., Ill, p. 238.
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legea secured some degree of freedom to the inhabitants, the city
and country aristocracy, in whose hands the government rested,
1
became more and more a closed caste.
However much individuals in the Convention may have ad-
mired the theory of the Dutch stadtholdership, their enthusiasm
must have been dampened by a knowledge of its later developments.
Aside from the failure to exclude the hereditary feature, certain
a
entangling foreign alliances, and the increasing indifference of
3
the Stadtholder to national interests, could hardly recommend
the office to American statesmen. The full extent of the failure
of the stadtholdership, as a form of free government, may be
realized from the fact that in 1813 the Dutch abandoned it forever,
4
and sought refuge in a limited monarchy.
The summary of Dutch history which Franklin presented
th ^
to the Convention on June 4 pictured forcefully, though a bit
unfairly, the antagonism between the stadtholder and the dtates-
General. His statements that the then stadtholder, (the weak and
irresolute William V), had forfeited the confidence of the nation
"^Blok "Hist, of the People of the Netherlands^ III, p. 39a
2
For instance, the marriage alliance of William V with the
piece of Frederick the Great. (See Hunt, 'Political Hist, of Eng.l
2, p. 298).
3
See Ibid., p. 298.
4
Van Loon, '*The Rise of the Dutch Kingdom," p. 245.
5
See Farrand's footnote, Farrand, I, pp. 102-103, for
Franklin's text this speech.
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by his English sympathies, driven the otates to seek i'rench protec-
tion, and, against the nation, had made use of his family alliances
with England and Prussia were all too true. His propheoy thi^t if
the abilities of William V proved equal to his inclinations a "ruin-
ous ... civil War would end in establishing an hereditary Monarchy
in his Family** must have had weight with his hearers.
In view of the history of the Dutch stadtholdership that
institution could hardly have been set up as a model to the Feder-
al Convention. V/hile there were a few fairly favorable references
2
to the government oi the United Provinces, the majority of refer-
3 4
ences were to its legislative usurpation, executive perfidy,
5
difficulty of amendment, oppression by foreign powers, evils of
See Hunt, Polit. Hist, of Bng.,X, pp. 297-300.
2
Mason, Ma., June 4; Farrand,!, p. 112; Martin, Y.,
June 28; Ibid., p. 454; Ellsworth; M. , June 29; Ibid., p. 469;
and Madison, Y. , June 28; Ibid., pp. 456-457. Contrast, however,
Madison, M. , June 28; Ibid., p. 449, and M. , July 14; Farrand, II,
p. 9.
3
Morris, M.
,
July 17; Farrand, II, p. 31; Butler, M.
,
Aug. 7; Ibid., p. 202. [Note that Butler had recently visited
Holland, P., June 2; Farrand, I, p. 92],
4
Franklin, M.
,
July 20; Farrand, II, pp. 67-68; Butler,
M.
,
Sept. 7; Ibid., p. 541.
5
Madison, Y. , June 29; Farrand, I, p. 476.
6
Madison, Y. , June 19; Ibid., p. 327.
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1
over-eraphasis on Soutes-rights , and the generally wretched con-
2
dltion of affairs.
Mr. Butler, writing to en Englishman in May, 1788, said,
••Vt'e had before us all the Ancient and modern Constitutions on
record, and none of them was more influential on Our Judgements
3
than the British in Its Original purity.'* The British constitu-
tion could not, in fact, have failed to influence the Convention.
It was but natural that English-speaking men, with little faith
in "a priori" constitutions, should make use of the system of
4
free government under which they themselves had lived.
Constitutional history had been in the making since
Pitt had become prime minister in 1783. He had reduced the King's
friends to submission, restored the cabinet as a council of the
Crown, and revived ministerial responsibility. On the other hand,
although Pitt was "a true Prime Minister ... the mainspring of
5
governmental action," the king's personal influence over the
1
Madison; Ibid., Morris, M.
,
July 7; Farrand,II, p.553«
2
Morris; Ibid., Madison, Y. , June 18; Parrand,I, pp.
3E6-327; Butler, Y. , June E; Ibid., p. 90.
3
Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, May 5, 1788; i'arrand
,
III, p. 301. The expression "Its Original Purity" contains a
thrust at the corruption in the British government. (See "Great
Britain, corruption in," in General Index; Farrand,III, p. 661).
4
Lodge, "Alexander Hamilton," pp. 60-61; Shea, "Alex-
ander Hamilton," p. IE; Cobbett, "Political Works" I, pp. E5, 57.
5
Robertson, "England Under the Hanoverians," pp. 310-
311.
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deliberat ions of Parliament was acknowledged, and the influence of
the Crown was still the preponderating element in the English con-
1
atitution.**
Piske has said that the fraraers of the Constitution
"were trying to oopy the British Constitution, modifying it to suit
their republican ideas: but curiously enough, what they copied
In creating the office of president was not the real English
executive or prime minister, but the fictitious ••• executive, the
8
sovereign,** Although some members, like Morris, may have real-
3
ized that the Prime Minister was the real king, the general idea,
according to another eminent authority, was to make the President
"a reformed and standardized king, after the Whig model," and Con-
gress '*a reformed and properly regulated parliament,** the difficul-
ty of which lay in the fact that the type of king and parliament
4
which the delegates had in mind did noo in fact exist. It is no
1
May, "Constitutional History of England", I, pp. 62-63.
Robertson, Op. Cit., p. 304, says that England was "still a long
way from the Victorian Cabinet system, and the Victorian conven-
tions and customs with regard to the place and functions of a
constitutional Crown," and that "Pitt*s Parliamentary duel and the
general election, when compared with the action of William IV and
Peel in 1834, illustrate not merely the astonishing power of the
Crown in 1^84, but the strong if vague desire of the nation that
the Sovereign should not be relegated to the position of the
Peishwa."
2
Fiske, "Critical Period," p. E89.
3
M.
,
July 24; Farrand, II, p. 104. Contrast Madison,
M. , June 4; Farrand, I, p. 99.
4
Woodrow Wilson, "Constitutional Government in the
United States," p. 82.
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discredit to tha discernment of the members of the Federal Conven-
tion that they rainunderstood the British constitution. It was by
no means certain, at that time, that a real cabinet system would be
continued after Pitt was out of the government.
A few of the delegates, it would seem, felt only contempt
1
for the British constitution. Hamilton went to the opposite ex-
treme and declared that "In his private opinion the British Govt.
was the best in the world; and .... he doubted much whether any-
Z
thing short of it would do in iimerica.** Others, while admiring
its theoretical excellence, deprecated a slavish adherence to the
British form, contending that conditions in America were so unlike
those in England as to offer no reason for the introduction of Brit-
3
ish principles.
1
For examples, see Mason, M. , June 4; Farrand,I, p. 101,
and Butler, M. , June EE; Ibid., p. 376.
2
M. , June 18; Farrand, I, p. S88.
3
For example, Gerry , M. , May 31; Farrand,!, p. 50. It
should be noted, however, that Gerry also expressed the hope that
the delegates would not be so prejudiced against the British consti-
tution as to adopt opposite measures '•in everything." Y; June 13; Y;
Farrand, I, p. S38.
Randolph did not regard the British Government a proper
prorotype for America, since "the fixt genius of the people" was
against it. (M. , June 1; Farrand, I, p. 66).
Wilson revered the theory of the British Government, but
felt the absence of rank, et cetera, precluded the possibility of
applying it in the United States. (K. , June 7; Ibid., p. 159).
Butler exclaimed that they were "always following the
British Constitution, when the reason of it did not apply." (M.
,
June 13; Ibid., p. E33).
Lansing said that the existence of state governments in
America made the British form inapplicable. (Y. , June SO; Ibid.,
p. 345]l
Charles Pinckney denied its applicability in the absence
of three distinct orders of rank. (M. , June S5; Ibid. , pp. 398-403 )
.
Rutledge asserted that the state constitutions, if remade,
would notapTH—§rr through blind adherence to the British model,
(M.
,
Aug. 13; Farrand, II, pp. 279-E80).
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It should be remorabered that many of the ifiiigliah features
of our government are derived not directly from Great Britain, but
1
indirectly, through the colonial governments. On the other hand,
the majority of the delegates doubtless felt a more or less con-
scious desire to benefit from the "good example of the mother coun-
2
try. How does it happen, then, that we are not living under a
cabinet system like England's? The reason is simply this, that the
framers of our constitution did not perceive the true outlines of
the British structure.
Americans of the *80s derived their chief ideas of the
3 4 5
British constitution from Blackstone, Montesquieu, Locke, and
6
John Adams. Ho one of these men had depicted the British consti-
tution as it had actually existed during the greater part of the
18 century.
Thus John Adams conceived the American colonial govern-
ments, *»at least those of New England, ... to be 'miniatures' of
the British." {Walsh, ^'Political Science of John Adams, 7).
2
Numerous references were made to the constitution and
government of Great Britain, and to certain special features, as
the negative of the crown, the position of judges, the arrangement
about money bills, and the treaty making power. (See »»Great Brit-
ain** in General Index; Farrand, III, p. 661). These references are
not always complimentary but do, in general, testify to a willing-
ness to be guided by the "long experience'^ of Great Britain, as con-
trasted with the new republic's "short experience of years." See
Dickinson, M.
,
Aug. 13; Farrand,II, p. 278.
3
Blackstone 's "Commentaries on the Laws of England" was
republished in Philadelphia. The Colonies are said to have ab-
sorbed 2500 copies before the Revolution. It at once became the
favorite legal^ text-book in America and a handbook of the law for
laymen. (Enc. Brit., Iv. p. 26; New Int. Enc.,III, p. 363).
4
See New Int. Enc, XVI, p. 198.
5
See Ibid., XIV, p. 276.
The first volume of Adams, "Defence of the Constitutions
( see next page
)
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Blackatone reoognized that England was a conat itutlonal
1
monarohy, but he magnified the royal authority. He "displays much
ingenuity in giving a plausible form to ooiomon prejudices and fal-
lacies; but it is by no means clear that he was not imposed upon
2
himself." However that may be, it is important, in view of his
influence in iimerica, that he failed to grasp the fact of the intro-
duction of the cabinet system in the time of Walpole in the first
half of the 18*^ century.
Montesquieu's interpretation of the British form of
government had come to Americans not only directly, but also indir-
ectly through the more widely circulated works of Blackstone and
Adams. Montesquieu was repeatedly cited in the Convention as an
3
authority on Sovernment, and his characterization of the British
system as composed of three distinct and balanced departments, the
4
legislative, executive, and judicial, was reflected in the debates.
of the United States" appeared in America on the eve of the Conven-
tion, and achieved a phenomenal success. {C. P. Adams, "Life and
Works of John Adams", I, pp. 430-431). Rush went so far as to say
that in this work Adams had done his country "more service than if
he had obtained alliances ... with all the nations of Europe."
(Letter to Richard Price; Parrand, III, p. 33).
1
Hunt, "Polit. Hist, of Eng.," X, p. 6.
2
Enc. Brit., IV, p. 26.
3
Y/ilson, K. , June 1; Parrand,I, p. 71; Butler, Y. , June
23; Ibid., p. 391; Madison, M. , June 30; Ibid., p. 485, also M.
,
July 11; Ibid., p. 580.
4
Dickinson, Y. , June 7; Farrand, I, pp. 156-157; Madison,
M,
,
July 17; Farrand, II, p. 34, also M. , July 21; Ibid., p. 77.
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Looke's "Essay on Government'* was well known to American
statesmen of the revolutionary and early oonetituti onal periods,
and, like the other English writings it pictured the British cons-
titution as oharaoterized by separation of powers. Special em-
phasis was laid on the predominance of the legislature among the
1
departments of government.
This interpretation, however, may best be described
through references to Adams' exposition. He succeeded, as Black-
stone did not, in grasping the spirit of Montesquieu. Unlike
Montesquieu he enjoyed a tremendous, a phenomenal sale, and unlike
Blackstone, the constitutional problem was his principal interest,
and not incidental to a study of law. Adams* central idea, in the
words of Francis Adams, is that "distribution of power in the three
parts, executive, legislative, and judicial, with the introduction
into the second of two opposing elements likely to reduce its other-
wise dangerous preponderance over the others, seemed to promise
3
security without the risk of feebleness." That Adams believed the
British Constitution to embody these principles shows how complete-
ly that constitution was misunderstood, and why the true constitu-
tion of Great Britain did not serve as a model to Americans.
1
See Hew Int. Enc.,XIV, p. 276 and XVI, p. 198.
2
See Hew Int. Enc.,III, p. 363.
3
C. F. Adams, "Life and Works of John Adams". I, p. 427.
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CHAPTER VII
The Convention's Estimate of Popular Support.
Aooording to members of the Convention^ "the eyes of
the United States" were turned on that aeserahly, "and their ex-
2
pectatlons raised to a very anxious degree." "Our affairs are
considered on all hands as at a most serious orlsls. No hope Is
entertained from the existing confederacy," wrote Madison, June Sthl"
4
And again, "The whole Community Is hlg with expectation."
Randolph, ten days later, asserted that If the Convention did not
succeed In Its work, the people would yield to despair,^ James
Wilson, speaking on the same day, said, "The people expect relief
from their present emharrassed situation, and look up for It to
this National Convention." Testimony of members of the Convention
Indicates that the people of the United States were looking hope-
fully and trustingly to the Convention. Though "very impatient
for ye event," according to Madison, "there was no evidence of
7
discontent at the secrecy of the sessions."
1
The writer has been unable to date to work with news-
papers of the period, but the indications are that there is little
of this material bearing directly upon the subject which is not
contained in Farrand's "Records" or secondary works.
2
George Mason to George Mason, Jr., June 1, 1787;
Farrand,III, p. 32.
3
Itodison to William Short, June 6, 1787; Ibid., p. 37.
4
Madison to Jefferson, June 6, 1787; Ibid., p. 36.
5
M. , June 16; Farrand, I, p. 256.
6
y> . Ibid.
, p. 261.
7
Madison to Jefferson, July 18, 1787; Farrand,III, p. 60.
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The delegates felt their responsibility to the people.
King's statement that "the people having already parted with tht
necessary powers It was Immaterial to them, by which"^ Government
they [were] possessed, provided they [were) well employed," was
not typloal of the spirit of the Convention, The members were
seeking to devise a form of government which would promise relief
for the political ills, and be acceptable to the people. There
were, of course, various gradations in this feeling. Paterson,
contending for a plan of "practical virtue" rather than of mere
theoretical excellence, held that this virtue lay In its Immediate
3
acceptability to the public. Washington, on the other hand,
actually said that the excellence of the form Itself was of greater
Importance than the present opinion of the people, but he took
this stand because he felt It was best for the people, and that It
4
would ultimately win their approval.
Who were "the people" that the delegates had In mind?
The population of the United States was not racially homogeneous,
even in 1787. The Jews are suggested as a factor in the situation
1
King was referring to the Articles of Confederation and
the Virginia Plan.
2
M. , June 6; Parrand,!, p. 183.
3
y. , June 16; Farrand,I, p. 258.
4
Hamilton to Washington, July 10, 1787; Hamilton's
"Works," I, p. 437.
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1
by their plea to the Convention for religious freedom. However,
as their letter aroused little or no Interest, they were quite
obviously of no politioal Importance at that time.
Only a few years later, In 1794, Dr. Priestly disoussed
the evils of hereditary monarchies with "the republican natives of
2
Great Britain and Ireland resident at New York." The "United
Irishmen," however, were obviously of little political Importance
In 1787, since their presence was not mentioned by members of the
Convention*
The Loyalists were a more Interesting element in the
population. Humphrey^* letter of September 16th to Hamilton
testifies that Loyalists were keenly interested In nimors of
monarchical propositions. That such propositions were not consid-
ered absurd by all Is proved by the following words of Sydney,
written on September 14th to Lord Dorchester: "The report of an
Intention on the part of America to apply for a sovereign of the
house of Hanover has been circulated... .and should an appli-
cation of that nature be made, it will require a very nice consid-
eration In what manner so Important a subject should be treated."
A fear which many loyal Englishmen may have felt is expressed In
Sidney's warning: " [l] t will upon all accounts be advisable that
any Influence which your lordship may possess should be exerted to
discourage the strengthening their alliance with the house of
1
Jonas Phillips to the Convention, Sept. 7, 1787;
FarrandjIII, pp. 78-79.
2
Cobbett's "Political Works", I, p. 24.
4
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Bourbon, whloh must ••••• follow were a aoverelgn to bo chosen from
any branch of that family.'*^
The Loyalists* line of reasoning Is suggested In Humphreys'
letter. They oould not conceive how the wretched conditions then
extlstlng oould be remedied except by a resort to monarchy. The
Bishop of Osnaburgh, George Ill's second son, seemed an available
candidate, and to some, at least, the Cincinnati appeared a depend-
able instrument for affecting such a change.
3
It should be remembered that thousands of the Loyalists,
including, of course, the most ardent ones, had fled to England,
or to Canada, the West Indies or other British possessions,^ either
during the war, or at its close. Those who had remained, or had
returned with the end of the war, were treated with the greatest
severity, despite the recommendation of Congress in accordance
with the terms of the treaty. Confiscation and proscription oon-
1
Farrand,III, pp. 80-81.
2
Humphreys to Hamilton, Sept. 16, 1737; Hamlltons "Works;'
I, p. 443. For further light on the proposal concerning the
British prince see extract from the Hew York "Daily Advertiser" of
Aug. 18, 1787; Parrand,II, p. 333. For a Frenchman's view of the
ineffioacy of the Cincinnati in such a plan see Otto's letter to
Montmorln, June 10, 1787; Farrand,III, pp. 43-44.
3
Some ten thousand Loyalists left the American Colonies.
(Eobertson, "England under the Hanoverians." p. 298).
4
Van Tyne, "Loyalists in the American Revolution,"
pp. 243, 298-299.
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tlnued. Most Important in the present oonneotlon Is the faot that
they were disfranch la ed in nearly every state. ^ "Quondam Tories'*
2
were still suffering under certain disabilities, and thus, however
3
much they hoped for "a future union with Great Britain," their
wishes were of little weight in 1787.
The olasslfloatlon whloh stood out in the Convention
was twofold; the "sober part of the Continent," who were looking
trustfully to the Convention for a remedy for existing political
4 RIlls, and the residue of the population, untutored and turbulent.
The distinction was not wholly one of property-holding versus non-
property-holding, for Dickinson and others affirmed that the great
e
mass of the people at that time were freeholders.
Madison's assertion that it was Impossible to know the
public will on the object of the Convention''' Is supported by
1
Van Tyne, "Loyalists In the American Revolution,"
p. 295*
2
"As late as 1801 Tories were disfranchised in Pennsyl-
vania," according to Van Tyne, "Loyalists," p. 295.
3
Humphreys to Hamilton, Sept. 16, 1787; Hamilton's
"Works", I. p. 443.
4
Phlnlas Bond to Lord Carmarthen, July 2, 1787; Farrand^
III, p. 63. Madison described this class as the "most enlightened
and respectable citizens." M. , June 12; Farrand^I, p. 215.
5
Hamilton, Y. , June 18; Farrand,!, p. 299. Gerry be-
lieved the good sense of the people would, in time, overcome their
prejudices. (Y., June 12. Farrand,!, p. 221), and Franklin, on
August 7th, praised their "virtue & public spirit." fM., Farrand, II,
p. 204).
6
M.
,
Aug, 7; Farrand, II, p. 202. Note also Hamilton's
argument on the necessity of ever balancing the many (debtors)
against the few (creditors) In order that neither oppress the other
M.
, June 18; Farrand, I, p. 288,
7
M.
,
June 12; Farrand, I, p. 216.
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slmllar statements by other members. Lansing, on June EOth, "ad-
mitted that there was no certain criterion of the publlo mind on
the aubjeot."^ Wilson pointed out the danger that the sentiments of
"the particular circle In ^ioh one moved," be "mistaken for the
general voice.
While professing that the people's opinions could not be
known on particular points, Madison was convinced that "In general
they believe there is something wrong in the present system that
requires amendment," and that if the Convention's plan should fall
to secure their happiness the people, in despair, would "Incline
to Monarchy." Gerry, on the contrary, held that the mere savour of
4
monarchy would alarm the people.
Optimistic views were held by some persons, both without
and within the Convention. Thus Edward Carrington, writing to
Thomas Jefferson, believed that the support given to even the
"shadows" under which the people were then living evinced a dis-
position on their part to be governed, and that if "a work of wisdorrf
was prepared for them they would "not reject It to commit them-
selves to the dubious issue of Anarchy."^ In Hamilton's words,
1
M; Farrand,I, p. 336.
2
M. , June 16; Farrand,I, p. 253.
3
Y. » June 12; Parrand,I, pp. 220-221.
4
Ibid., p. 220.
6
Carrington to Jefferson, June 9, 1787; Parrand, III,
p. 38.
I
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"Our people [wero] disposed to have a good government, but thla
disposition [might] not always prevail.""^ At that time, however,
he anticipated that "their good sense, and above all, the necessity
of their affairs" would Induce the people to adopt the proposals of
2
the Convention.
There were some who ventured to assert in whole or In
part, what public opinion really was. One of these was Lansing,
who, unlike his colleague, Hamilton, believed the "prevalent opinion
of America" was "that granting additional powers to Congress would
answer their views; and every power recommended for their approba-
tlon exceeding this idea" would be fruitless. Colonel Mason,
while admitting that "the mind of the people of America, as else-
where, was unsettled as to some points" Insisted that it was
"settled as to others," namely, '^attachment to Hepublican Govern-
ment" and "to more than one branch in the legislature." The basis
of his conclusion was that the state constitutions agreed "so gen-
4
erally in both these circumstances." Mr. Gerry did not hesitate
to announce that "there were not l/lOOO part of our fellow citizens
who were not agst. every approach towards Monarchy."^
1
Y., June E9; Parrand, I ,pp. 473-474.
2
Ibid., p. 474.
3
y. , June 16; Farrand,!, p. 258.
4
M., June 20; Ibid., p. 339.
6
M. , June 26; Farrand,I, p. 425.
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Hamllton'a notes for June let Include a olear and In-
teresting outline of Randolph's speech of that date. The part per-
taining to public opinion Is as follows:
*•! Situation of this Country peculiar
II.-Taught the people an aversion to Monarchy
III All their Constitutions opposed to it
IV - Fixed character of the people offered to it
V - If proposed 'twill prevent a fair discussion
of the plan."-^
The situation, as It appeared to Madison, is summed up
In his letter to Jefferson of September 6th, as follows:
"Nothing can exceed the universal anxiety for the event
of the meeting here» Reports and conjectures abound concerning
the nature of the plan which is to be proposed. The public however
2
is certainly in the dark with regard to it. The Convention is
equally in the dark as to the reception wch. may be given to it on
its publication* All the prepossessions are on the right side,
but it may well be expected that certain characters will wage war
against any reform whatever. My own idea is that the public mind
will now or in a very little time receive anything that promises
1
H. , June 1; Farrand,I, p. 72.
2
The lady who is reported by MoEenry to have asked
Franklin, "Well Doctor what have we got a republic or a monarchy?"
was certainly "in the dark." Her question, however, betrays no
special anxiety. Farrand,III, p. 85.
3
These were the men holding State offices under the
Articles of Confederation. See Hamilton's letter to Washington,
July 3, 1787; Hamilton's "Works," I, pp. 436-436.
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Btablllty to the public Counolls & eeourity to private rights, and
that no regard ought to be had to looal prejudices or temporary
oonslderatlonst"^
Farrand has suggested that If certain delegates were In
faror of monarchy, they may have circulated hints of monarchical
2
plans In order to "try out public opinion." It is significant
that one of the denials that the Convention was considering a king
3
came from Luther Martin, a strong enemy to monarchical tendencies,
and that a Pennsylvania paper, probably at the request of officers
4
of the Convention, published a similar denial. On the other hand,
Hamilton betrayed especial Interest In the situation while ap-
parently attempting no denials. On August 20th he wrote to Jere-
miah Wadsworth, of Hartford, asking him to trace to its origin a
letter circulated in Connecticut, a copy of which Hamilton had seen.
He expressed himself at loss as to its object, and had "some sus-
picions" that it had been "fabricated to excite jealousy against
the Convention." He explained that he had "different reasons of
some moment" for setting on foot an inquiry as to the political
connections of its author eind "the complexion of the people most
active" In circulating it.
1
Farrand, III^ p. 77. Note that Nathan Dane, writing from
the point of view of one outside the Convention who had heard of
the Virginia plan, wrote, July 5, 1787, "Perhaps the public mind
will be prepared In a few years to receive this new system,"
{Letter to King, July 5, 1787; Farrand, III, p. 55 L
2
Farrand, "Framing of the Constitution," pp. 174-175.
3
Letter to Gov. Casewell, Aug. 20, 1787; Farrand, III, p. 7a
4
"The Pa. Journal," Aug. 22, 1787; Farrand, III. p. 73-74.
5
Hamilton's "Works'! I, p. 440.
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Colonel Wadsworth's answer oontalnod the Information
that the letter had heen printed some time before In the New Haven
papers, and that it appeared to have been written to prepare the
Antl-federallets '*to comply with the doings of the Convention lest
worse befall them." He confessed that the close of the letter
appeared '^calculated for other purposes," and says he has asked
hie friend, Colonel Humphreys for further Information. Wadsworth
described Wetmore of Stratford, who had formerly had the letter in
his possession, as "rather talented and enterprising, but fickle."^
Although unable to trace the letter to Its source Colonel
Humphreys discovered that it had been published in a Fairchild
2paper as early as the 25th of July. Further, he had talked with
Mr, Wetmore and learned that he had first seen it in the hands of
Jared Mansfield. This man had "formerly been reputed a Loyalist"
and, according to Colonel Humphreys, the letter itself seemed to
have been "received and circulated with avidity by that class of
people, whether it was fabricated by them or not." He felt little
doubt but that the letter was "manufactured" in Connecticut. Mr.
Wetmore, on being asked his opinion as to the objects of the writer
of the letter had said that "he believed it might be written prin-
cipally for the amusement of the author, and perhaps with some view
to learn whether the people were not absolutely indifferent to all
government and dead to all political sentiment."^
1
Hamilton's "Works", I, pp. 440-441.
2
The writer has found no evidence that this letter is
extant.
3
Col. Humphreys to Hamilton, New Eaven, Sept. 16, 1787;
Ibid., p. 442.
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Colonel Humphreys further explained that before he had
seen the letter in question, Mr. Meigs had published an account of
It, "attempting to exolte the apprehensions of the Anti-federalists'*
with the purpose desoribed by Colonel Wadsworth. While some thought
this the "real design of the fictitious performance," others "with
more reason, thought It was Intended to feel the public pulse and
to discover whether the public mind would be startled with pro-
positions of Royalty*"'''
The real hope of the "Monarchists" must have been that
public opinion had been misread by advocates of non-monarchical
forms, and that It was, moreover, steadily changing for the better.
Hamilton, In July, was certain that such was the case. "I have
conversed with men of information, not only of this city [Hew York]
but from different parts of the State; and they agree that there
has been an astonishing revolution for the better In the minds of
the people." "The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is,
that the Convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opinion,
will not go far enough. They seem to be convinced, that a strong,
well-mounted government will better suit the popular palate than
one of a different complexion. Men in office are, indeed, taking
all possible pains to give an unfavorable impression of the Con-
vention; but the current seems to be moving strongly the other v/ay.
A plain, but sensible man, in a conversation I had with him yester-
day, expressed himself nearly in this manner: The people begin to
be Convinced that 'their excellent form of government' ........
will not answer their purpose, and that they must substitute some-
1
Hamilton's "Works", I, pp. 442-443.
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thing not very remote from that whloh they have lately quitted.
These appearances, though they will not warrant a conclusion that
the people are yet ripe for such a plan as I advocate, yet serve
to prove that there Is no reason to despair of their adopting one
1
equally energetic."
The idea discussed above, that the present need was to
be met by a temporary expedient, since great changes could be
2
effected only slowly, differs only In degree from the hope which
Hamilton, and perhaps some others, may have cherished,
A letter written by Ashbel Baldwin of Connecticut at the
close of the Convention impresses one with the fact that public
opinion was indeed the biggest problem which the delegates had to
solve. "The New Constitution is out, the Egg-shell is broke- but
*tis impossible as yet to determine how it is relished... I
am alarmed at the consequence of its being either received or re-
jected, the majority will not be sufficiently large on either side
for a subject of such vast consequence."
1
Hamilton to Washington, July 3, 1787; Hamilton's "Works
I, pp. 436-436.
Z
Chap. Ill, p.x^.
3
Beardsley, "Samuel Seabury," p. 317.
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CONCLUSION,
Thomas Hart Benton reoordeil some words of Rufae Zing In
the belief that they ''ought to be remembered by future generations,
to enable them to appreciate Justly those founders of our government
who were In favor of a stronger organization than was adopted,"
They are as follows: "You young men [Benton and hie generation]
who have been bom slnoe the Revolution look with horror upon the
name of a King, and upon all propositions for a strong government.
It was not so with us. We were born the subjects of a King, and
were accustomed to subscribe ourselves 'His Majesty's most faith-
ful subjects;' and we began the quarrel which ended In the Revolu-
tion, not against the King, but against his parliament."^
The question in the present work may be expressed once
more, in a new form, as follows: Did Monarchical tendencies, such
as might be expected in such an atmosphere as King described,
actually exist? The answer is in the affirmative. We have seen
that Washington had reason to recognize their existence, that a
Prussian prince was probably invited to become king of America and
that similar invitations to an English and to a French prince were
contemplated by some. In foreign opinion, it would seem, monarchy
was America's only alternative to anarchy. Most important, per-
haps, we have found reason to believe that Hamilton's plan not
only embodied certain monarchical principles, but was offered in
1
Benton, "Thirty Years' View", I, p. 58. The paragraph
was written in connection with King's retirement from the public
life in 1826,
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the firm belief that they would find some degree of support both
within and without the Convention, and that Hamilton's belief was
doubtless justified,
A ohain, it would seem, may sometimes be stronger than
Its weakest link. While no single olroumatanoe In the five years
studied proves that monarchical tendencies existed in the United
States, to any significant extent, a more complete survey of the
period proves that although they did not work out to their logical
conclusion, such tendencies were actually a factor in the situa-
tion*
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